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Abstract 
For more than a decade, the Swedish personal assistance act has been subject to 
extensive cutbacks. More and more people have lost assistance whilst fewer are 
granted allowances. These cutbacks have transpired without any parliamentary 
decisions limiting the scope of the legislation. As such, the government claim to have 
no part in the development, holding the cutbacks to be the result only of 
administrative court rulings and government agency interpretations. According to the 
government, discretionary power over the personal assistance act has transferred, 
from political representatives to independent courts and agencies. The scholarly 
literature on juridification, the theoretical field describing this type of development, 
generally share the governments’ assertion regarding the implications of 
juridification: as political reforms are changed because of court rulings and 
government agencies’ interpretations, elected political representatives are rendered 
powerless whereas the discretion of bureaucrats is increased. Accordingly, 
juridification is described as a zero-sum game where the forfeited power of political 
institutions is gained by independent agencies. In this thesis, I challenge these 
assumptions.      
 By analyzing the development of the assistance reform between 2005 through 
2017, interpreting government letters of appropriation, investigations, court rulings, 
and government agency reports, I suggest that the government is not rendered 
powerless in the governing of the personal assistance act. Rather, by governing the 
juridification process itself, politicians can govern through juridification. I conclude 
that the government should not be perceived as disconnected from the austerities of 
the assistance reform but as a governing actor, utilizing juridification as a political 
technology. Moreover, given these findings, I challenge the prevailing understanding 
of juridification as a zero-sum game, transferring power away from democratically 
elected politicians. Instead I propose that juridification must also be recognized as a 
tool of governance. Juridification, then, does not infer a zero-sum power transfer but 
opens up for alternative ways of governing policies in the modern welfare state.  
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1 Depoliticization of LSS through 
Juridification 
During the past ten years, users provided personal assistance through the ’Support 
and Service for Certain Disabilities’ (henceforth LSS) Act (1993:383) have witnessed 
a rapid austerity of how the law is interpreted and acted upon. Due to several court 
rulings changing how the law is interpreted as well as additional legal specifications 
from enforcing government agency, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
(henceforth the SSIA), many users have received limited benefits, whilst others are 
left without personal assistance completely. The ratio of rejected applications are 
currently at an all-time high and the number of users covered has gone down for the 
first time since the law was implemented in 1994 (SIR 2017:4). The situation has 
emerged without any political decisions or change to the law’s wording. On the face 
of it, the LSS-act is very much the same as it was before the cutbacks began. 
However, since 2007 we can see a rapid and steady decrease, both in terms of rate 
and number of granted applications, and a rapid and steady increase in the share of 
rejected applications. (Brennan et al. 2016) Faced with criticism that the intentions of 
LSS-act are foregone and that the reform is being dismantled, the government has 
responded that they have no discretionary power to hinder the development, which, 
according to them, is the result of administrative court’s rulings and SSIA 
interpretations. (Regnér 2016) It thus appears as the development and future of this 
major social welfare reform hinges upon the discretion and interpretation of courts 
and SSIA bureaucrats, leaving the political representatives in parliament and 
government powerless. The LSS reform has seemingly ventured into the juridical and 
bureaucratic sphere, rendering the field depoliticized.  
 In the academic literature, this type of depoliticization, where traditional political 
actors and institutions forfeit discretionary power over formerly political areas to 
politically independent institutions, is labeled juridification. Often asserting that 
juridification presents one of the greatest threats to modern democracy, plenty of 
scholarly attention has been directed towards the phenomena. According to the 
literature, this threat to democracy is a consequence of the of transfer power, from 
democratically elected political representatives, to the discretion of courts and 
bureaucrats. Through juridification, it is argued, democratic influence over policies is 
substituted for juridical and bureaucratic review and discretion. (Blichner & 
Molander 2008; Randeria 2007; Ferejohn 2002; Habermas 1987; Loick 2014; Mouffe 
2002; Hirschl 2008; Magnussen & Banasiak 2013; Brännström 2009; Fransson 2016; 
In this thesis I challenge the prevailing notion that depoliticization and juridification 
necessarily entail the transfer of power away from political representatives and 
suggest that governments can govern through juridification. Consequently, 
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juridification, I propose, can be understood as a tool for state governance. By 
drawing on previous studies and empirical findings, I showcase how the juridification 
of LSS and the personal assistance act, to a large extent, is the result of a shifting 
conception of the rule of law. This is coupled with an increased emphasis on 
coherence, uniformity, and transparency in the administration of assistance 
applications, and a decreased emphasis on achieving the underlying social-political 
goals of the legislation. I will demonstrate how state governance is made possible 
through juridification by developing and utilizing a formal understanding of the rule 
of law. I thus contend that juridification should not only be perceived as the transfer 
of power away from government, but also as a tool of government. As such, I 
suggest that current scholarly descriptions of governance in relation to juridification 
and depoliticization do not provide sufficient account of power-relations in modern 
welfare societies.   
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2 Understanding Depoliticization 
through the Assistance Reform and Vice 
Versa  
I have two main reasons for conducting this study. The first is empirical and driven 
by curiosity to understand what has happened with LSS and the assistance reform. 
There are few academic studies mapping recent years’ development of LSS and the 
personal assistance act. Given the severity of the situation as well as the magnitude of 
the reform, both in terms of resources allocated and the welfare it provides, this 
empirical gap needs to be addressed. Therefore, by mapping the development leading 
up to today’s situation, I seek to contribute to understanding what has happened.
 When I started the empirical investigation, it became evident that the assistance 
reform to some extent had become juridified. The government’s position were that 
recent time’s cutbacks had been beyond the control and discretionary power of the 
government. The situation, they claimed, was solely the result of administrative court 
rulings and interpretations made by the SSIA. (Regnér 2018)  
 This led me to the second reason of the study, namely the theoretical aspect of 
this case. In the academic literature mapping and analyzing juridification processes 
and consequences, there is a consensus holding that juridification necessarily infers a 
transfer of power: from government, to courts and government agencies. According 
to the literature, juridification limits the discretionary power of political 
representatives and transfers it to independent institutions beyond political control or 
influence. Consequently, juridification is described as a zero-sum game where the 
power lost in the one end, inevitably ends up in another. (Hirschl 2008; Blichner & 
Molander 2008) By applying a different perspective on power, shifting focus from 
power as a stable property, possessed by institutions, to perceiving power as 
something fluctuating in the practices of the institutions, I challenge the predominant 
perspective on power and governance in relation to juridification. The second reason 
for conducting this study is, therefore, through the case of LSS and the personal 
assistance act, to contribute to a more multilayered understanding of what 
juridification is and, especially, what juridification entails in terms of power and 
governance.      
 This thesis is thus intended to work on two levels of abstraction. The lower level 
is constituted by the empirical study of the austerity of LSS and especially the 
personal assistance act. The higher level is developed by applying the theoretical 
framework onto the case-study, thereby indicating something is missing and what 
that something might be. There is no internal hierarchy between the two research 
interests. Rather, I consider the two aspects co-dependent. The empirical study 
guides the development of the theoretical framework, and the theoretical framework 
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provides understanding of the empirical case. The same logic applies to the two 
research questions stemming from the research interests formulated above: 
 
(1) How can we understand the last ten years austerity of the assistance 
reform which has transpired without direct political interference or 
action? 
 
(2) What does the juridification of the assistance reform entail in terms of 
government discretion, power, and governance? 
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3 Depoliticization, Juridification and the 
Rule of Law – Towards a Theoretical 
Framework 
Theoretically, I approach the two research questions by analyzing the development 
of the assistance reform as a case of depoliticization. Depoliticization is regarded as an 
umbrella-concept under which related theoretical perspectives are brought in to 
contribute to a more conceptually narrow and analytically precise study. As such, this 
chapter elaborates on how juridification can be perceived and utilized as a specific 
form of depoliticization. Juridification, in turn, I suggest, can be studied in relation to 
shifted perception and application of the rule of law.    
 In summary, this chapter begins with a depiction of how depoliticization is 
conceptualized and used in academic literature. This is followed by an account of 
how juridification relates to depoliticization, how the concept is utilized in the 
academic literature, and how it relates to governance and power. Lastly, I develop on 
the rule of law-concept and suggest how it can be used to study juridification and 
thus also depoliticization.  
3.1 Depoliticization 
Over the last two decades, an increasing amount of scholarly work has been focused 
on the abstract, yet evident development referred to as depoliticization. As the name 
suggests, depoliticization refers to the general processes and tendencies where 
democratic political institutions and elected politicians loose influence and 
discretionary power over traditionally political issues, fields, and discourses. This in 
favor of increasing influence of international organizations, NGOs, co-operations, 
independent agencies and courts (Shapiro & Sweet 2002; Hay 2007; Sweet 2000; 
Nyberg 2017)    
 According to the definition deployed by Flinders and Wood, depoliticization is 
“the denial of political contingency and the transfer of functions away from elected 
politicians” (2014:135). As proposed by the broad nature of this definition, 
depoliticization seems yet to be coherently encircled by the academic literature. 
According to Flinders and Wood, depoliticization has emerged “as an increasingly 
visible but strangely nebulous concept” (2014:135), referring to the suspicion that 
something has changed: something in terms of the relationship between the citizens and 
the state, something in how the role of elected politicians has been marginalized, and 
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something about the imposition of technocratic impartial and just rule. Depoliticization 
seeks to point to and explain these somethings. Flinders and Wood sum up the 
concepts as “a system of describing the manifold transformation of contemporary 
democracy” (2014:137). 
 Still wide and elusive in its application, attempts have been made to define the 
outer limits of the concept, partly by categorizing its theoretical and empirical use in 
the academic literature. Among these are Foster and colleagues (2014), who discuss 
the theoretical basis of the concept. They hold that depoliticization does not entail 
the end of politics or the creation of a space free from politic. Rather, they, as most 
scholars, perceive depoliticization as the transfer of politics. As such, the 
depoliticization of one field necessitates, to some degree, the politicization of 
another. The concept itself thus infer a narrow conception of politics, referring 
mainly to traditional political actors, such as elected politicians, governments, 
parliaments, and government agencies. Consequently, depoliticization assumes the 
transfer of power in relation to these traditional political actors. (Flinders & Buller 
2006:296)     
 This transfer of power, gathered under the umbrella term depoliticization, have 
been used and studied in a wide array of processes, fields and contexts. Stone Sweet 
discusses depoliticization in relation to the development of constitutional law (2000), 
others perceive the concept as a process of development and liberalization, granting 
citizens and markets more freedom in relation to the state, whilst other examines 
depoliticization as a matter of decreasing political participation and as a result of 
distrust towards politicians and government institutions. (Hay 2007; Ferejohn 2002) 
 Foster and colleagues (2014) seek to bring order to these scattered applications 
and understandings by categorizing the concept under two main definitions. The first 
category deals with depoliticization as a deliberate governmental tool for statecraft: 
 
These types of governmental definitions are concerned, primarily, with the 
reassignment of blame, responsibility and the transaction costs of policymaking via a 
variety of different methods and strategies. […] They refer to de-politicisation 
specifically as a tool of government and one which relates primarily to the deliberate 
exercise of statecraft and attempts at crisis avoidance. (Foster et al 2014:227) 
 
 Depoliticization according this definition is thus mainly understood as different 
strategies employed to govern from a distance. Flinders and Buller describe this type 
of depoliticization as a “defensive risk management technique”, used to push away 
sensitive topics and thereby not getting the blamed for the consequences. (2006:297; 
Hirschl 2008:19) Accordingly, depoliticization is as a deliberative tactic, for example 
utilized to install seemingly independent departments and government bodies, 
implementing precise laws and rules limiting the discretion of politicians once in 
place.      
 The second category is wider than the first in its approach. If depoliticization in 
the former definition is mainly conceived as a deliberate governing tool, employed to 
avoid blame and conflict, the second is concerned with the plethora of possible 
processes and consequences in-between the polar opposites ‘depoliticization’ and 
‘politicization. Often, studies exploring this space are normative in nature, developing 
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upon the risks and consequences in term of legitimacy, representation, transparency 
and democracy in relation to ‘depoliticization’ and ‘politization’. (Foster et al 
2014:227; Hay 2007; Hirschl 2008) Consequently, studies focusing on the democratic 
aspects of depoliticization generally conceive of it as problematic. In their view, 
depoliticization entails a transfer of power, from democratic institutions and actors, 
to non-democratic actors such as courts, technocrats, multinational corporations, 
non-governmental organization, and interest groups. Depoliticization, these studies 
argue, cripple state power and influence, lending less discretion to elected 
representatives in favor of non-state actors. Accordingly, depoliticization is often 
equated with de-democratization. (Foster et al. 2014:228; Fawcett & Marsh 2014; 
Randeria 2007) 
 To summarize, in both categories, depoliticization is perceived as implying 
transfer of power. In the first view, this transfer is used to deflect blame and 
attention and thereby gain legitimacy in the long run. Power is thus intentionally 
transferred to other institutions. The second definition regards depoliticization as 
power transfer not necessarily intentionally initialized by political representatives. 
Rather, depoliticization is generally ascribed broad and procedural explanations, such 
as globalization, liberalization, and marketization. 
3.1.1 Depoliticization as Juridification 
This theoretical categorization of the perception of power and intent in relation to 
depoliticization is valuable for the purposes of this thesis as it helps teasing out how 
to make use of the depoliticization concept, whilst also exposing insufficiencies and 
gaps in the literature. However, depoliticization remains theoretically nebulous and 
general in its application. Therefore, to achieve more theoretical precision, as well as 
better analytical support for my empirical studies, I utilize a specific form of 
depoliticization, namely juridification. As such, the theoretical foundations and 
categorizations applicable to depoliticization also apply to juridification.  
 It should, however, be noted that the depoliticization literature and the 
juridification literature are usually not overlapping (Exceptions include Randeria 
(2007) and Flinders & Buller (2006). I think there are at least two reasons for this 
which I in abstract account for before moving on to explain juridification and why I 
think it could be used in relation to depoliticization.   
 The first reason might come down too concept definitions and limitations. Some 
depoliticization scholars would categorize the institutions involved in juridification as 
political, why the internal dynamic of power between government, parliament, 
government agencies, and courts, does not imply depoliticization, as this usually infer 
a transfer or transformation of power to somewhere outside their perception of the 
political. (Flinders & Wood 2014:152-154) I do not think a specific and robust 
definition of the ‘political’ is necessary for a theoretical application of the 
depoliticization literature. For my purposes, in this context, I apply theories on 
depoliticization to understand the relationship between three institutions; the 
government, a government agency, and the administrative courts. Some might object 
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that this relationship does not involve depoliticization, as all three institutions are 
within their perceptional realm of the ‘political’.  What is political and not political 
will always be debatable, elusive and dynamic, why it, I hold, cannot be a defining or 
excluding aspect for the application of the concept. Therefore, to delve on what is, 
was, or isn’t political dilute focus from interesting aspect of depoliticization, namely 
the study of the changing dynamics of power in relation to government. As such, I 
will treat depoliticization at its core and perceive the concept as a way to understand 
mainly political institutional power dynamics.   
 Secondly, juridification is not synonymous with depoliticization. Hence, where we 
find depoliticization, we do not necessarily find juridification. There are surely 
instances where juridification is politicizing. The non-linear relationship between the 
two concepts might refrain scholars from using them in tandem. However, 
juridification as well as depoliticization are broad concepts, covering a wide array of 
mechanisms and processes, why it would be unreasonably limiting to conclude that 
because certain aspects of juridification are politicizing rather than depoliticizing, the 
two concepts are irreconcilable.    
 Consequently, my claim is not that juridification share all aspects of 
depoliticization, or vice versa, but rather that there are aspects of juridification which 
can benefit from drawing on understandings from the depoliticization literature. As 
stated by Flinders and Bullers: 
 
[d]espite the challenges of research methods, frameworks and boundaries, 
depoliticisation, carefully employed, offers fertile conceptual territory in which to 
expand our knowledge and understanding of contemporary governance processes. This 
is because depoliticisation is most closely associated with the (re)distribution and 
understanding of power in modern societies. (Flinders & Buller 2006:314) 
 
 As made clear by the authors, the limits of what is to be included in 
depoliticization are not definitive, but it is undoubtedly so that it revolves around 
modern-day governance processes. Considering this, I think it is fruitful to 
understand juridification as a matter of depoliticization, since they both deal with 
(re)distribution of power and governance in relation to traditional political 
institutions. Flinders and Buller (2006:312) share this conception and categorize what 
they call ‘judicial depoliticization' as a subcategory to depoliticization, and concludes 
that the same processes, mechanism, and tactics may well apply to both concepts.
 Analytically then, I do not view juridification as conceptually distinct from 
depoliticization. Rather, juridification should here be perceived as a special form of 
depoliticization. Subsequently, using the concept juridification limits the scope of 
implications, causes, processes, and consequences involved since it specifically targets 
only a limited part of the scope encompassed by the general depoliticization-
literature.      
3.2 Juridification 
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Having briefly clarified my intentions with utilizing both depoliticization and 
juridification as well as the relation between the concepts, I now turn to explore 
juridification. This will be done by first elaborating on its previous use and theoretical 
implications, where after I map its usage in a Nordic judicial context, as well as 
determining how I will perceive and use it in this thesis.    
3.2.1 What is Juridification? 
Juridification is often understood as ‘the expansion of juridical power’, the move 
towards objective technocratic reliance and governance, or as general tendency where 
traditional national political issues are decided through courts, bureaucrats, and 
international tribunals. (Blichner & Molander 2008) Often used as a minimum 
definition, Jürgen Habermas conceives of juridification as a process characterized by 
two main features: horizontal expansion and vertical density. Horizontal expansion 
refers to juridification where law and legal norms spread to new previously 
unregulated areas and thus come to explicitly regulate additional aspects of social life. 
(Blichner & Molander 2008:42; Fransson 2016:40; Brännström 2009:248) 
 Juridification in relation to an increase in vertical density, on the other hand, refers 
to the additional specification of existing legal norms and acts. As legal norms are 
clarified, specified, and developed so to be more discernible and directly applicable in 
additional situations, for example through court rulings, government intervention, or 
interpretation of enforcing government agencies, vertical juridification takes place. 
Consequently, through formalized and specified judicial norms and standards, 
vertical juridification juridify aspects of social life previously not explicitly specified 
and therefore subject interpretation or discretion. (Blichner & Molander 2008:42; 
Hirschl 2008:4) 
 It is not always clear which are the causes and which are the consequences of 
juridification. Often, the scholarly literature makes no distinction between the two 
but perceive juridification as a process on a spectrum. This entails that the process is 
understood as juridification, and the consequences are described as more 
juridification. Juridification is thus usually depicted as a process and a result. This ties 
into the general perception of juridification as a spectrum, rather than a binary state 
where there either is juridification, or there is not. A modern state will always be 
juridified to some extent, why increasing juridification refers to an increase and not 
the start of juridification.  
3.2.2 Why Juridification? 
As previously described, the depoliticization literature has been roughly divided into 
two main analytical categories. In the first category, depoliticization is conceived as a 
deliberative tactic, utilized by governments to avoid blame and distance themselves 
from contagious political issues. The second category describe depoliticization more 
as a structurally generated process, where power gradually is transferred from 
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political institutions to other entities. My contestation is that similar categorization 
can be made for the juridification literature.   
 Starting with the first category, Hirschl describes multiple ways in which 
juridification has been conceived of as a deliberate political strategy. (2008:19-21) 
Similar to Flinders and Buller (2006), Hirschl shows how governments delegate 
policymaking authority and discretion to avoid responsibility and blame for sensitive 
political issues:  
 
[i]f the delegation of powers can increase credit or legitimacy, and/or reduce the blame 
placed on the politician as a result of the delegated body’s policy decision, then such 
delegation can benefit the politician. […] [T]he judicialization of politics is largely a 
function of concrete choices, interests, or strategic considerations by self-interested 
political stakeholders. (Hirschl 2008:19) 
 
 Johannesson (2017:190) has described such technics in relation to the Swedish 
asylum processes, showing how the government distanced itself from the harshly 
criticized rejection of asylum applicants by handing over responsibility and 
discretionary power to asylum courts. By doing so, the government handed over the 
“hot potato” to the judiciary, thereby evading media scrutiny and public disapproval. 
Hirsch continues with describing instances where juridification is actively instigated 
by political actors to achieve certain ends, could it be to enforce controversial 
legislation, thwart or hinder political opposition and policy proposals, or as a tool 
used by civil interest groups to exercise political influence through courts. Signifying 
for these tactics is that they are deliberative and actively instigated to achieve certain 
political ends. (Hirschl 2008:21; Randeria 2007)   
 With regards to governance, this view implies that the juridification process itself 
is a direct result of political governance, which, as a result, leaves the governor with 
less discretionary power than before. According to this view, the juridification of a 
political area is perceived as a tradeoff, where political influence over one are is 
substituted for legitimacy gains or blame defection, for example. Consequently, 
juridification is understood as a transfer of power from one political entity to 
another.      
 This type of intentional politically instigated juridification process described by 
Hirschl (2008), Flinders and Buller (2006), and Johannesson (2017) is however not 
the dominant perspective on the processes of juridification. A widely applied view is 
that the processes driving juridification cannot usually be traced back to a specific 
deliberate actor, actively initiating the process. Conversely, many scholars depict 
juridification as the result of broad, structural mechanisms and developments. 
Habermas (1987) links the development of juridification to the emergence of the 
modern welfare state. Similarly, Weber understood juridification as a natural 
consequence of the modern bureaucratic state where individual rights, the rule of 
law, and administrative impartiality conquered subjective arbitrariness. (Magnussen & 
Banasiak 2013:326; Brännström 2009:34) Others ascribe the ever-increasing 
juridification to public distrust and disinterest in politics. Whereas politics and 
politicians are perceived as self-interested and bias, courts and bureaucrats are 
regarded as objective and impartial. (Hay 2007) Furthermore, the late 20th-century 
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surge of new democracies, the global proliferation of human rights discourses and 
practices are regarded as tokens of juridification. Globalization and the increasing 
influence of international organizations and treaties are described as instigators of 
this developments. This as international courts, such as the EU Court, legal treaties, 
and human rights agreements, often override national legal norms and acts. (Nyberg 
2017; Johannesson 2017:59; Brännström 2009; Ferejohn 2002:42; Sweet 2000) 
Moreover, international treaties and legal norms, originating from for example the 
World Bank, the World Trade Organization or the United Nations, can have a 
substantial impact over national judiciary. (Blichner & Molander 2008:37; Hirschl 
2008:5) As such, juridification is often assigned structural explanations, ascribing 
recent developments to phenomena associated with globalization and 
internationalization. 
3.2.3 Swedish Juridification  
In a Swedish welfare context, the juridification of politics is usually described in 
terms of the second category and can be divided into two main processes driving the 
development.  
 The first perceives juridification primarily as a result of globalization and 
especially EU legal integration, where Swedish politics and legislation, ever since 
entering the Union, have had to subject to the rulings of the EU court. (Nyström 
2017; Brännström 2009)     
 The second category draws upon structural social, economic, and ‘discursive’ 
factors to explain the development. Marketization and privatization of welfare 
services, the increasing incorporation of vague human rights acts in Swedish social 
welfare legislation, and increasing bureaucracy are depicted as driving forces. 
(Lindblom 2004; Brännström 2009; Runesdotter 2016) Accordingly, Sanna Fransson 
analyses the consequences of judicialization in relation to a change towards a 
discourse of rights, focusing on free choice of schools. Fransson concludes that the 
strengthened influence of courts limits the legislators’ governance capacity. 
Juridification moreover, Fransson argues, erodes the rule of law, which further 
threatens core democratic values such as legitimacy, predictability and, substantial 
justice. (Fransson 2016). Caroline Runesdotter (2016) also analyzes the consequences 
of the juridification of Swedish schools and concludes that the increased focus on 
formal rights and specified rules, alters the pedagogical logic, forcing school personal 
to follow bureaucratic goals and rules rather than directly responding to the need of 
the student.      
 Laila Brännström (2009) develops upon juridification to study the development of 
Swedish Health Care acts during the late 20th century. Since around the 1990s, the 
political has become increasingly juridicialized, she holds. Brännström suggests that 
this development is mainly explained by the increasing influence of global 
conventions and international law, forcing politicians into the margin of political 
discretionary power. But, Brännström holds, juridification is also the result of:  
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“the use of legislative techniques with framework laws and general rules of law, greater 
elements of basic human rights incorporated into national laws, which require judicial 
review in order to be concretely acted upon”. (2009:157)  
 
 The consequences of juridification, Brännström argues, entails a move towards a 
more Weberian bureaucratic and formal discourse, where the legislative and 
bureaucratic bodies of government strive for generalizability of legal norms and their 
applications. This, in turn, limits the space for professional discretion and the 
consideration of human rights, generalize and labels the individual’s specific 
circumstances to comply with specified norms and rules, and undermine the 
underlying political goals of policies. (2009:238)   
 Brännström concludes that the juridification of Swedish politics and governance 
have had substantial impact and is in many ways clearly visible in contemporary 
governance; the number of legal norms superseding political decisions have 
increased; disputes formerly handled by government agencies have transferred to the 
administrative courts; relationships are now to a higher degree specified through laws 
or other legal sources. (Brännström 2009:312) 
3.3 Juridification and the Transfer of Power 
 
As evident from the wide range of processes described as driving mechanisms of 
juridification, juridification is studied from many different angles. What these 
different perspectives have in common, however, is the perception that juridification 
gradually transfer power from political entities to autonomous institutions and 
agents. This is an important similarity. Juridification is commonly understood as 
interlinked with transfer of power. Be it a transfer from national governments to 
national courts and bureaucracies, or a transfer from national governments to 
international organizations. Through juridification, political influence and discretion 
is understood to transfer from political representatives to courts and government 
agencies. Scholarly work focusing on governance and democracy in relation to 
juridification generally describe the transfer of power related to juridification as a 
“zero-sum game”. Accordingly, they claim, as the judiciary gains power, the political 
institutions lose it (Magnussen & Bansiak 2013:339; Blichner & Molander 2008:45; 
Hirschl 2011:21; Lindblom 2004:238-239,258; Ferejohn 2002:44-45; Fransson 2016; 
Brännström 2009; Johansson 2011). As held by Blichner and Molander:  
 
law’s expansion and differentiation [herein described in terms of horizontal and vertical 
juridification] is often seen to increase the interpretative power of the legal system at 
the expense of democracy in general and the legislature in particular. (2008:48) 
 
 As such, increasing juridification is perceived as a threat to democratic values and 
institutions, rendering elected political representatives powerless, as the influence of 
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autonomous agencies and courts grow. Accordingly, the Swedish legal scholar 
Joakim Nergelius claims that it “may be seen as symptomatic for judicialisation [sic!] 
that courts get more powers at the expense of political institution” (2001:83). Legal 
scholar Per Henrik Lindblom agrees, holding that “increase in power on the one end 
often implies a decrease on the other” (2004:238). He describes the power-transfers 
related to juridification as a competition between the three state powers. As courts 
increase their power, executive agencies seek to regain influence lost by usurping 
power from the legislator. Consequently, according to Lindblom 2004:258) and 
others, as juridification progresses, power is transferred from the legislator to 
government agencies and courts. (Brännström 2009:310, 312; Blichner & Molander 
2008:42; Ferejohn 2002:62; Hirschl 2011:21; Magnussen & Bansiak 2013:327)  
3.3.1 Juridification and the Rule of Law   
 
My contestation is that the implications of juridification in relation to state 
governance, discretion and power seem to be lacking. The prevalent view that the 
juridification of politics entails a direct transfer of power, where the result is 
described as a zero-sum-game, must be critically assessed and empirically tested.  
One way to study the process of juridification and thereby analyze its consequences 
for governance and power, is to study the understating and implementation of the 
different aspects of the rule of law.     
 As suggested by the scholarly literature, juridification is closely associated with the 
expansion of law. Vertical juridification specifically relates to the process where 
existing norms and legislations are further specified and clarified to coherently 
differentiate between different situations. In the scholarly literature, vertical 
juridification is often described as the dominating force of the legal development of 
the welfare state. The post-WWII surge in ‘vague’ social law, protecting human rights 
and reallocating resources, gained prominence in national legislation and required 
judicial review to be concretely acted upon. As such, administrative courts and 
government agencies were given the discretionary power to interpret and further 
specify the legislations. (Blichner & Molander 2008:42-43; Hirschl 2008:42; 
Brännström 2009:157) A consequence of this development is that especially social 
law undergoes vertical juridification. This as broad social-political goals are specified 
and clarified to be more easily applied by the bureaucracy.   
 This type of vertical juridification is closely related to the formal aspects of the 
rule of law, also described as formal legality. However, in the academic literature, the 
rule of law is usually understood as a concept consisting of two conflicting 
components: formal legality and material legality.  
3.3.2 Formal and Material Legality and Juridification   
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Formal legality is in many ways the foundation of the modern liberal legal state. It 
refers to the bearing principles that everyone is equal under the law. That the legal 
and political system is just, unbiased and rule according to the law. Judges and 
bureaucrats have a constitutional obligation to be objective, nonpartisan and lawful 
in their processes. (Lewin 2017; Bäckman 2013:49) According to Lennart Erlandsson 
(2009:39), formal legality includes three main interlinked features; predictability, legal 
equality, and transparency. Formal legality thereby serves to establish predictability 
for actors interacting with institutions. This necessitates that all similar cases are 
treated equally, that there are limited regional or individual differences in the 
application of the legislation, and that the application process is transparent and open 
form scrutiny. This entails the application of the legislation must be coherent, 
uniform, and thus provide limited room of discretion for the individual caseworker. 
(Fransson 2016:38; Bendz 2010:7; Bäckman 2013:48)  
 Material legality refers to the more substantial aspects of legal authority and finds 
application predominantly in welfare-related policy areas. It adds to formal legality by 
inferring that norms and legislations should not only be interpreted in accordance 
with their formal wording but also adhere to the underlying political intentions and 
with regards to the needs of the legal subjects and how these relates to the social-
political goals. (Lewin 2017) Material legality thus adds to the principles the rule of 
law by aiming towards a legal system where not only the legal procedures are 
predictable, coherent, and transparent, but the result of the application process is 
ethically just and reflect the underlying political goals. The function of material 
legality is to ensure efficiency in relation to the social goals of a policy. (Bendz 
2010:9; Bäckman 2013:73-74)     
 However, obtaining material legality requires case-by-case review, that context-
sensitive legal applications are conducted where caseworkers are required to use 
discretion. This is an obvious threat to predictability, uniformity, coherency, and 
predictability, and therefore to formal legality. There is thus a dilemmic relationship 
between these two components of the rule of law. When emphasis is put on the 
formal aspects of the rule of law, juridification often progresses. This since formal 
legality implies the necessity of uniformity, coherence and transparency the in 
application of a certain act, which spawns the need for legal specification and 
standardization. Material legality on the other hand, emphasizes goal achievement 
and an application following the social-political goals of the act. Therefore, as formal 
legality gains prominence over material legality in bureaucratic and government 
discourse and application, less discretion to independently apply the law in 
accordance with its social-political goals is granted the individual caseworker. Such 
development is thus in line with what Habermas labeled vertical juridification: 
through court rulings and government agency specifications and clarifications, 
previously undefined aspects are juridified. Therefore, as formal legality gain 
prominence in juridical and political discourse and application, juridification is likely 
to progress, due to the implicit perceived importance of clarity, juridical equality, and 
transparency, following with formal legality. To reach such standards, acts, norms, 
and laws need to be specified by courts, legislators, and government agencies, which 
leads to vertical juridification. (Johansson 2011:203)  
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 Exploring the tension between formal and material legality can thus, as Susanna 
Johansson (2011) and others suggest (see Magnussen & Basiak 2013:325; Gustafsson  
2002:364; Blichner & Molander 2008:38; Fransson 2016:40), be one way of analyzing 
the processes driving juridification. For these authors, a move towards a more formal 
understanding and application of the rule of law can be understood as correlated 
with further juridification.   
3.4 The Rule of Law in Swedish Welfare 
Administration 
The dilemmic relationship between core aspects of the legal welfare state, actualized 
by formal contra material legality, has been an issue of Swedish political debate and 
governance for the most part of the twentieth century. (Bendz 2010) The tension is 
often concretized in areas of social law. This as social law, such as LSS and the 
personal assistance act, is designed to achieve certain social-political goals rather than 
specifying certain actions and procedures. Social law, therefore, is often constructed 
as framework legislations to be flexible and fulfill the specific needs of the individual 
included within the frame of the law. (Bäckman 2013:73-74; Gustafsson 2002:391-
392) This, to some extent, make social framework law incompatible with a 
completely formal application of the rule of law, emphasizing high degrees of 
predictability and uniformity. This inherent conflict means that governments, 
institutions, and organizations must balance the contradicting principles incorporated 
under rule of law. (Bendz 2010:6) Several studies have shown that the applied 
balance has shifted over the years. (see Gustafsson 2002; Johannesson 2017; Bendz 
2010; Brännström 2009) 
3.4.1 The Rule of Law and the SSIA 
 
Anna Bendz have studied the development of the rule of law in relation to the SSIA 
and the Swedish parliament from the 1960’s until the mid-2000. Her analysis shows 
that the tradeoff between formal and material legality has been an ever-pressing 
concern during the development of the SSIA and have in many ways formed the 
organizational structure of the agency. (Bendz 2010:6) 
 During the 1960’s, the SSIA underwent substantial organizational and structural 
reforms. Prior to these, the SSIA local offices had been more or less independent 
private social insurance organizations to which one actively had to join to be covered. 
However, with the expansion of the social welfare state, the government sought to 
ensure that no one fell outside social insurance net. The independent SSIA agencies 
were brought into government control and became part of the national social 
insurance system. However, the government fund it beneficial to let the local 
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agencies maintain a large portion of discretion and independence. This would 
enhance the capability for the local caseworkers to “apply the social insurance in 
accordance with its material intentions.” (Bendz 2010:18) Bendz concludes that the 
1960’s reforms had the intentions to better achieve social-political goals which best 
was done by adhering to the material aspects of the rule of law, in the form of 
discretion for the individual caseworker, as well as local independence. (Bendz 
2010:19)     
 Adherence to material legality dominated bureaucratic and administrative welfare 
reforms also during the 1970’s and the first half of the 1980’s. Realization of political 
goals were the main priority for the SSIA and several steps were taken to do so. 
Centrally enforced rules, guidelines, and detailed governance were reduced to let local 
caseworkers use their discretion to accomplish the overarching social-political goals. 
(Brännström 2009:200; Bendz 2010:24-26) Decentralization of the social insurance 
system was perceived as a way to achieve materially correct decisions, adaptable to 
the specific circumstances. Bendz holds that the reforms during the 1970’s and 80’s 
further shifted the balance towards values closely associated with material legality. 
(Bendz 2010:31)    
 However, during the late 80’s and early 90’s, the balance between material and 
formal legality was shifted. Legal scholar Håkan Gustafsson holds that during this 
time, the strong liberal state returned, affecting the general conception of the rule of 
law. Not only with regards to the SSIA, but also in the general legal and political 
discourse and application; 
 
it is evident that the formal understanding of the rule of law becomes ever more 
present in academic legal debates, and marks a return from a material to a formal 
understanding of the rule of law. (2002:354)  
 
 In social welfare administration the return of formal legality can be exemplified by 
the 1996/97 Social Security Committee report, stating that the social insurance was a 
national system why the state needed to be in control of the system “in order to 
guarantee economic efficiency, and legal certainty and uniformity in the application 
of the system.” (Bendz 2010:34) The committee furthermore held that a bearing 
principle of the social insurance system was that the “insured is treated fairly, not 
only with regards to the material appropriateness of the application, but also so that 
the same rules are applied in the same way, regardless of local agency” (Bendz 
2010:34). The reasoning of the Social Security Committee was, according to Bendz, 
denotative of the shift towards more emphasis on formal legality, returning in the 
1990’s. (2010:34)     
 The reforms of the SSIA during this decade followed the logics of the Committee, 
leading to a more centralized steering in order to achieve higher level of uniformity 
across the local agencies. Local discrepancies and caseworker discretion were 
conceived as problematic, threatening the rule of law, which now, primarily, was 
understood as formal legality. The reasoning leading up to the reforms signaled that 
the main objective of the SSIA was to achieve formal legality, such as predictability, 
uniformity, and transparency. This in contrast to previous focus which had been to 
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ensure applications corresponding with aspects associated with material legality, such 
as efficiency in relation to achieving the underlying political intentions of the applied 
legislation. (Bentz 2010:36-37)       
 The focus on formal legality continued to shape the reforms of the SSIA also in 
the next millennia. The government sought to further centralize the SSIA and 
minimize local and individual differences in application. This prompted a complete 
reformation of the SSIA. All independent local social insurance agencies were 
admitted by the one centrally governed agency, the SSIA. The central agency would 
control all local offices so to achieve complete uniformity and coherent 
interpretation with regards to the applications of social insurances. (Bendz 2010:43)
 Bendz concludes that during the centralizing reforms of the 1990’s and the 2000’s, 
the rule of law concepts explicitly refers to uniformity and equal legal treatment. 
According to Bendz, to reach the underlying goals of the policies applied is thus 
subordinate to the objectives of formal legality. (2010:47)  
3.4.2 Formal Legality and Juridification  
 
The return to a formal understanding and application of the rule of law can be 
perceived as closely related with processes of vertical juridification. Vertical 
juridification takes place when the legal acts, norms, and rules in a field densifies. As 
the SSIA became increasingly centralized to erase local differences in application, 
rules, guides, and norms were implemented to make central steering possible and 
limit the discretion of the individual caseworker. To some extent, a shift towards a 
more formal application of the rule of law drives vertical juridification.  It seems as 
the shift towards formal legality is simultaneous with the juridification process of 
Swedish social-politics. This supports the proposition that vertical juridification can 
be studied by analyzing the perception and application of the rule of law.  
3.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter I have sought to suggest that the personal assistance act can be 
perceived as a case of depoliticization, thereby situation the development is a general 
trend where political areas presumably venture into the control typically apolitical 
actors. In the case of personal assistance, these acts are usually depicted a courts and 
government agency. As such, the depoliticization of the assistance act can more 
narrowly be categorized as juridification, as it specially addresses this type of 
development, involving courts and government agencies. To follow the processes 
leading to the juridification of a political field, several scholars have proposed to 
study how the rule of law-concept is understood and applied by relevant actors. This 
as a formal perception of the concept often entails juridification whereas a material 
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understanding usually dampens juridification.    
 As such, by studying the understanding of the rule of law as connected with the 
juridification process, I can tease out underlying mechanism which has led to the 
juridification of the assistance reform and thus also how the cutbacks can be 
explained. Theoretically then, by applying this perspective, we can study how the 
reform have become depoliticized and what this entails in terms of power and 
governance.      
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4 Approaching Juridification and 
Cutbacks 
4.1 Interpretative Policy Analysis  
 
This thesis is intended to operate on two co-constitutive levels of abstraction; the 
development of the personal assistance act is interpreted through the analytical lens 
of juridification and the theoretical understanding of juridification is developed with 
the help of the empirical analysis.     
 It is therefore imperative that the methodological tools assist and contribute to 
this dual approach. I thus utilize an abductive approach, allowing for a mutual 
communication between the empirical case and the theoretical perspectives. 
(Erlandsson 2014:91) As suggested by Klaus Krippendorff (2013:86), an abductive 
approach seeks to interpret the empirical material through a theoretical framework. 
Hence, abduction not only reveals implicit aspects and meanings of the material but 
also surfaces the theoretically general in the specific case. For this thesis, this 
approach entails that the case of personal assistance is studied by interpreting the 
implicit meaning and understanding of the actors involved in the development. This 
by applying the theoretical framework of juridification and the duality of the rule of 
law. Based on the interpretation of the case, the abductive method furthermore 
allows for more general theoretical suggestions to be made.   
 This methodological approach appeals to what is often labelled ‘interpretative 
policy analysis’, which, according to Hendrik Wagenaar “acts on the assumption that 
the general is folded into the particular” (2007:433). Following this logic, to 
understand the general, in this case the implications of juridification, we must 
interpret the meaning of concrete observable actions and events, coming from 
concrete actors. (Wagenaar 2007:432)   
 According to Wagenaar, “[i]nterpretative approaches to political studies focus on 
meanings that shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which they do so” 
(2011:3). Meaning is a key concept since it captures the essential contestation that the 
meaning people attach to social phenomenon or concepts is not only perceptional, 
but “constitutive of political actions, governing institutions, and public policies” 
(Wagenaar 2011:4). Consequently, meaning influences and constitutes practice. As 
such, practice “expresses the insight that knowledge, knowledge application and 
knowledge creation cannot be separated from action: that acting is the high road to 
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knowing. (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003:20)    
 Accordingly, understanding (knowledge) and meaning are closely related to and 
constitutive of practice. Therefore, to understand practice, one must analyze its 
underlying components: the understanding and meaning of the practice. 
Consequently, this view holds that the object of study ought not to be explicit 
actions of the institutions and actors, but the meanings and understandings 
constituting their practices and actions. As such, to study the development and 
governance of the assistance reform, one should not only study the explicit actions of 
the actors involved. Rather, in accordance with interpretative policy analysis, one 
must study the meanings and understandings constituting the actions of the actors.  
 This conception of power and governance is a departure from much of the 
previous work on juridification, where power often described as a zero-sum game, 
where to loss of power in one institution by necessity entails gains of power in 
another. Shifting focus from action to the constitution of practice, changes the target 
of analysis. Approaching juridification with the tools provided by interpretative 
policy analysis allows for an analysis beyond this rigid perception of governing and 
power. As such, this perspective opens up for analyzing not only the explicit actions 
leading to the cutbacks of the assistance reform, but more importantly, the 
understandings and meanings making the actions viable.  
4.2 The Case of Personal Assistance 
 
Have laid out the methodological underpinnings of this study, I now turn to address 
why I think LSS and the personal assistance act are appropriate cases of study. The 
personal assistance act is part of the wider LSS legislation and I will in this study 
focus especially on the development of the personal assistance act. 
 First, the personal assistance act has merit as a typical and interesting case of 
juridification in a Swedish welfare legislation context. Understanding the 
development and governance of the personal assistance act can therefore contribute 
to a better understanding of juridification as theoretical concepts and its effects on 
welfare governance.      
 There are numerous factors making the assistance reform a typical case of 
juridification; the act was developed and implemented during the period when many 
claim juridification took off. It furthermore exhibits many of the characteristics the 
academic literature describes as especially susceptible to juridification; it is based 
upon the idea of human rights; it is a frame law, focusing on goal achievement rather 
than on precisely formulated measures; and, it is a social welfare law. Together, 
according to pervious research, these factors make for a perfect storm of 
juridification. (Brännström 2009; Blichner & Molander 2008) As such, the case of the 
personal assistance act has the potential to tell us something more general about 
modern-day welfare governance in juridified fields. 
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 Secondly, the Personal Assistance Act is not only a typical case of a juridified 
welfare legislation. It is also a typical case of a Swedish welfare legislation. LSS and 
the personal assistance act are framework laws, consciously leaving room for 
interpretation of the specific application of the acts. Frame-work legislations are 
often deliberately constructed to open for discretion in the application of the specific 
case. This as the legislator have difficulty constructing all-encompassing legal texts, 
taking the specific circumstances of every situation and every individual case into 
account. (Erlandsson 2014:30) Some of the founding and goal-related concepts of 
the personal assistance act are thus deliberatively vague.  Framework law furthermore 
allows for the legislator to stipulate the overarching social-political goals, whilst 
government agencies and administrative courts interpret the specific applications. 
(Brännström 2009:194; Gustafsson 2002:291)    
 More un-common, however, is that the personal assistance act allows for private 
providers. When the act was enforced in 1994, a key aspect was to promote 
independence and autonomy for the users. This should be achieved by letting the 
individual user dispose of the allowances granted. The user could thus use the 
allowances to purchase assistance from any type of provider, be they in private or 
municipal regime. In the early years of the reform, this did not spark much political 
or media attention. However, as more and more users chose private assistance 
providers and reports on fraud and overuse gained great attention the profit interest 
of the private companies came to be perceived as a problem needed to be controlled 
and regulated. (Altermark & Nilsson 2017; Näsman 2016)   
 As such, the personal assistance act is in many ways a typical example of a 
framework-legislation, sharing similar features with other Swedish welfare 
legislations. However, the legislation differs in the regard that it allows for private 
providers, which, as we shall see, affects how the reform have been perceived and 
governed.   
 Thirdly, the assistance reform is topical and for many people an urgent and 
important legislation, having fundamental impact for their daily lives. To me this is 
not to be undervalued as a reason for selection. In and by itself, I find it truly 
interesting to analyze the practices making it viable to dismantle a major welfare 
reform without parliamentary or governmental decisions. Given the impact the 
assistance reform has in many people’s lives, understanding why and how it develops 
and changes is important for the future of the act and for how similar legislations are 
to be constructed and governed.     
 My contention is thus that the personal assistance act makes a good case to study, 
not least since it has interesting implications on both a theoretical and on an 
empirical level. Yet, the conclusion it is a suitable case does not infer it must be the 
only case. However, given the limited time and space of this thesis, I think it 
overbearing to conduct two (or more) independent empirical case studies. As stated 
by Wagenaar, interpretative policy analysis is a “painstaking and systematic process”, 
where the researcher through “the careful and precise registering of the concrete 
behavior of concrete actors […] hope to arrive at an interpretation that makes what 
was initially opaque, in the final analysis (more) senseful” (Wagenaar 2011:21-22). 
Interpretative policy analysis thus relies on depth and precision more than width and 
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overview. My contention is therefore that what is lost in generalizability is made up 
for by paying close attention to the complexities and subtleties of the practices in the 
one case.  
4.3 Material and Timeframe  
When engaged in interpretative policy analysis, the object of analysis is practice. This 
infers that the material interpreted in this study must be a representation of such 
practices. In this thesis, I explore how the understanding, meaning, and application 
of rule of law have developed and how this relates to juridification and the 
development of the personal assistance act. What I look for, specifically, is therefore 
material that can contribute to unpacking the meaning ascribed to rule of law and 
how it shapes the practices of the actors involved in the governing of the personal 
assistance act. According to Dvora Yanow, the situated understanding and meaning 
of a political institution is found in the practices of the institutions studied. 
Therefore, interpretative policy analysis is concerned with studying: 
 
legislative and agency texts and physical objects and acts and practices emanating for 
the institution studied. All of these expressions are to be conceived of as analogues of 
meaning. (Yanow 2003:232) 
 
 Document, reports, statements, guidelines, investigations, etcetera, are therefore 
to be conceived of as “real” expression of meaning at a particular time, in a particular 
context. Following from interpretive analysis, these sources of material are to be 
taken seriously and are not isolated document, generated by isolated individuals on 
isolated context. Rather, material stemming from the actors studied is to be perceived 
as the result of the institutional culture, of its vested understandings, meanings, and 
practices. (Yanow 2003:232)    
 Accordingly, I will interpret the material stemming from the actors involved in the 
governance of the assistance reform. To establish which material is relevant I will 
abstract describe the LSS-legislation, how it is governed, formed, and changed. 
 The LSS-legislation is a rights-based framework law, lending the specific 
applications and extent of the service broadly defined. This leaves the responsible 
agency, the SSIA, to interpret the intentions of the legislation, decide who is eligible, 
how many hours of personal assistance the user requires to conform to the law’s 
boundaries and intentions, etcetera. If the user does not agree with the assessment of 
the SSIA, the case may have to be resolved by the administrative courts, where the 
rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) are precedent. Also, the SSIA 
can take cases to court to force a precedent ruling clarifying and specifying concepts 
or aspects of the legislation. It is thus ultimately the administrative courts that 
stipulate how the SSIA should interpret and apply the legislation. Influential court 
rulings are thus part of the material interpreted. However, being the responsible 
independent government agency, the SSIA also possess discretionary power when it 
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comes to applying the act. (Erlandsson 2014)    
 First, the SSIA interpret the rulings of the administrative courts, so that these can 
be abstracted from the specific case and applied into a general context. These 
interpretations often come as ‘legal positions', to which all caseworkers are expected 
to adhere. ‘Legal positions’ are independent interpretations as a court ruling 
essentially only addresses the specific circumstances up for trial, whereas the general 
‘legal position’ of the SSIA must provide guidance for all similar cases and 
circumstances. Consequently, the ‘legal positions’ employed by the SSIA are by 
necessity interpretations of courts’ rulings and not direct implementations. (Näsman 
2016:24)         
 Secondly, when no precedent court rulings provide guidance in interpreting the 
legislation, the SSIA can produce internal guides and manuals, assisting the 
caseworkers in how certain situations should be assessed. The SSIA also produces 
independent ‘legal positions’ on areas not yet clarified by court rulings.  (Erlandsson 
2014:39-40)      
 Given the independence of Swedish government agencies, the government cannot 
directly govern the interpretations and applications made by the SSIA. The 
government can, however, guide the focus and goals of the SSIA. This is mainly 
done through the yearly Government Letter of Appropriation (GLA), in which the 
government stipulate the goals and focus areas of the SSIA for the upcoming year. 
At the end of the year, in the SSIA yearbook, the agency responds by describing 
which measures have been taken to meet the goals of the letter of approbation. If the 
government or the SSIA want a certain reform or policy area to be further analyzed 
and developed, investigations seeking to bring clarity and guidance, can be initiated. 
Such investigations are thereafter often used to guide the work and focus of the 
SSIA.       
 Briefly mapped in the above are the official administrative ways in which the LSS 
and the Personal Assistance Act are governed. By interpreting the meaning and 
knowledge in relation to the rule of law embedded in the material, I will develop an 
understanding of how the legislation has been juridified and governed. To gain more 
comprehensive access to the reasoning behind certain practices I will also include 
public statements and interviews from involved actors.    
4.3.1 Time constraints  
Special attention will be directed to material from the period between 2005 and 2017. 
This for several reasons. First, 2005 is the first year of the new centralized SSIA 
organizational structure. This entails such a profound change that the time before 
this restructuring is in many ways complete separated from the time after. Prior to 
2005, the decentralization of the SSIA organization did not allow for central 
governance of the agency, neighed from the government or of the agency itself. The 
centralization of 2005 however made central governance possible, which was one of 
the main reasons for the reorganization. 2005 is thereby also the first year the 
government issues a Letter of Appropriation to the SSIA, and the first year the ISSA 
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respond to that letter in their yearbook. Moreover, 2005 can be said to mark the 
beginning of the stricter application of the personal assistance act. Prior to 2005, 
most changes in the application had meant that scope of people included in the act 
was widened and that more people gained access to the reform. 
4.4 Summary 
Detailed analysis of the process of juridification in relation to the rule of law opens 
the study of how the juridification process was governed, which mechanisms of 
powers were at work, and how they transferred and transform during the process. By 
interpreting the understanding and meaning forming the conception of the rule of 
law and its application, I can approach an understanding of how the legislation has 
been governed and what has led to the cutbacks. As such, by studying the process of 
juridification of the assistance reform through the lens of material contra formal 
legality, I can explore an alternative way to understanding governance in relation to 
juridification.  
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5 The Development of the Personal 
Assistance Act  
5.1 LSS and the Personal Assistance Act  
 
The LSS-law was implemented January first, 1994. It requires of all Swedish 
municipalities to provide “certain support and service” to people with permanent 
and severe physical and psychological. Providing personal assistance is one such 
‘certain support and service’. The personal assistance act is thus a sub-category to the 
LSS-law (LSS 1993:387) The underlying social-political goals of legislation are to 
”promote equality in living conditions and full participation in public life […]. The 
goal is to provide the individual the opportunity to live like others” (§5 1993:387). 
Paragraph seven develops on the goals of the ten measures and stipulates that 
“through the measures, the individuals covered shall be assured good living 
conditions […] and enhance their ability to live an independent life” (§7 1993:387). 
Personal assistance is eligible for those who “because of severe and lasting disabilities 
need help with their personal hygiene, meals, getting dressed and undressed, 
communicating with others or other assistance requiring thorough knowledge about 
the disabled” (§9a 1993:387). These help-needs are referred to as ‘basic needs’. 
Personal assistance is granted for individuals estimated to require assistance with 
basic needs for a minimum of twenty hours per week. Twenty hours is thus the 
threshold below which individuals must rely on other forms of support and 
allowances. (Näsman 2016:15)  
5.1.1 Cutbacks on Personal Assistance 
One year after the personal assistance act was implemented, it covered about 6 100 
recipients. On average they were granted approximately 67 hours of personal 
assistance per week. More than ten years later, in 2005, some 13 000 people were 
eligible to an average of 100 hours per week. According to estimations made by the 
SSIA, about 50 percent of the surge was explained by a general increase in 
population and by two major changes to the personal assistance act and its 
application. The first change was due to a Supreme Administrative Court ruling from 
1996, which determined that the basic need ‘requiring in-depth knowledge about the 
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disabled', should include ‘active supervision'. This ruling resulted in a surge in the user 
population, especially among children now becoming eligible for personal assistance. 
The second change came in 2001 when the act, through a parliamentary decision, 
was changed to remove the upper age limit, thereby also providing personal 
assistance for people over the age of 65. The other half of the surge was explained by 
more applicants and a rise in the average number of hours granted per user. (SIR 
2015:13, p.7)      
 If the first ten years of the reform was signified by an increasing number of users, 
hours, and applicants, the last twelve tell a different story. In 2005, the number of 
people losing personal assistance due to insufficient basic needs were 53. In 2017, 
473 people lost their assistance for the same reason. In 2005, 33 percent of all 
applications for personal assistance were rejected by the SSIA. During the first six 
months of 2017, more than 83 percent of all applications were rejected. Furthermore, 
from a steady increase in recipients between 1994 and 2015, recipient numbers for 
the first time began to decline in 2016. As of 2017, 14 886 people were eligible for 
personal assistance, compared with 16 119 in 2016. Also for the first time, in 2017, 
the average number of hours of personal assistance granted by the SSIA were 
declining. (Assistanskoll.se Statistics)  
5.1.2 The Debate on Personal Assistance  
Before starting the analysis of how the personal assistance act have developed, I will 
in abstract describe the political and media debate surrounding the personal 
assistance act during this time.    
 Ever since the act was implemented in 1994, the cost of the reform has been 
subject for debate. From the get-go, more people than calculated became eligible for 
more time than calculated. (SII 2015:9) Up until 2016, both average hours granted 
and people eligible, rose continuously. In 1995 the personal assistance act cost the 
state about 3 700 million SEK. In 2015, the costs had risen to approximately 29 700 
million (the figures refer to fixed costs, not accounting for inflation etcetera). 
(Assistanskoll.se Statistics)    
 Throughout the years, the cost development has spawned political attention and 
several investigations have been launched to explain and suggest measures to 
dampen the rising costs. The first of such investigations was appointed already in 
1995 and suggested reforms allegedly saving up to 900 million SEK. (Näsman 
2016:22) The next major investigation with similar objectives was the ‘Assistance 
Committee’, which was initiated in 2004. The committee found that part of the 
personal assistance allowances ended up being used for unintended purposes and 
that the risk of fraud and overuse in the system was impendent. (Näsman 2016:22; 
SOU 2007:73, p.45-46)     
 These findings became the starting point for many investigations to come, seeking 
to determine the extent of fraud and over-use related to personal assistance 
allowances, and how to effectively counter it. Several investigations found that the 
rate of fraud and overuse were especially prevalent within personal assistance. (FUT 
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2007:7; SSIA 2009, 2010; ESV 2011:11; SOU 2012:6; Dir 2016:40) In the media 
debate, the responsible ministers have often proposed that approximately ten to 
twelve percent of the total cost of the personal assistance allowances are due to fraud 
and over-use. (Altermark & Nilsson 2017:26-29) I will not develop on the soundness 
of these figures or how they came about, but content to say that it is within this 
conceptual realm, holding that the assistance reform to be especially afflicted by 
fraud and overuse, policies are made and measures are taken. 
5.2  Regional Differences, Legal Clarifications and 
Cost Development - 2005 – 2008 
In the first two government letters of appropriation to the newly established and 
centralized SSIA, issued for 2005 and 2006, the instructions regarding disability 
politics were to enhance “the quality of the support and service for girls, boys, 
women, and men with disabilities”. It was furthermore stated that the goal was to 
strengthen the core values of the LSS-reform, namely participation and autonomy for 
people with disability. (GLA 2005:5; 2006:6) The SSIA did not respond directly to 
these goals in the corresponding yearbooks but sufficed to state that the ongoing 
centralization and re-organization of the agency were starting to show intended 
results, thereby “simplifying central governing and creating possibility for a more 
coherent application of laws and rules” (SSIA 2005:3).  According to the SSIA, this 
was especially evident regarding measures taken to reduce sick leave, which had been 
successful. (SSIA 2005:3)  
 According to the 2006 yearbook, similar measures were also required for the 
personal assistance act. This as regional differences in time allowance were 
understood as caused by ambiguities in the wording of the legislation, not clearly 
defining how to coherently assess and calculate user needs and time allowance. 
According to the SSIA, the ambiguities created excessive room for caseworker 
discretion and interpretation, damaging uniformity. The new centralized organization 
of the SSIA were, however, according to the SSIA, well suited for “strengthening 
uniformity through clearer guidelines to the caseworkers” (SSIA 2006:69).
 Accordingly, in 2006 and 2007, the SSIA imposed several new legal positions, set 
out to clarify aspects of the personal assistance act previously left for discretion. 
(SSIA 2006:69) The new legal positions meant stricter interpretation on time granted 
for basic needs (help with meals, getting dressed, and personal hygiene), as well as 
narrower definitions of what constituted basic needs. According to the SSIA, the 
new interpretations came as a response to the problem that the concept basic needs 
previously had been interpreted differently by different caseworkers. (SIR 2015:13, 
46) In an interview, the operation manager of the SSIA at the time, stated that the 
work towards more coherent applications, which these legal positions were a result 
of, was started in 2005 when the SSIA was merged into one centrally governed 
agency. (Assistanskoll.se 2010) The consequences of the new legal positions showed 
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effects already in 2007 when the SSIA reported a noticeable decline in the approval 
rates of personal assistance allowances. According to a SSIA report (SIR 2015:13), 
this decline in approval rates was a direct consequence of the new legal positions 
enforced by the SSIA in 2006 and in 2007, making less people meet the requirement 
of 20 hours of basic needs per week   
 In the early years of the centralized SSIA, clarity, uniformity and limited 
caseworker discretion, seem to have been closely associated with the perceived need 
for centralized governance and formal legality. It thus seems as the general 
description of the development of the SSIA, increasingly emphasizing the need for 
strengthened formal legality, also applied to the assistance reform. Formal legality 
was conceived the main objective, why individual caseworker discretion and 
deviations were to be restrained. Accordingly, creating national coherence in 
application and limiting local independence were described as the main objective of 
the new SSIA organization. 
 The SSIA’s efforts to further strengthen formal legality by limiting the room of 
discretion and legal interpretation for the individual caseworker continued in 2007. 
The focus was heightened by 2007’s letter of appropriation, in which the government 
extended to goals related to the personal assistance act: 
 
[t]here have been considerable differences between different regions with regards to 
average hours of assistance granted ever since the implementation of the personal 
assistance act in 1994. […] The SSIA shall account for these differences and present 
actions to limit them. The SSIA shall also assess if the actions are effective and 
sufficient in reducing the differences. The SSIA shall also analyze in which way the 
discrepancies affect the cost development of personal assistance. (GLA 2007) 
 
 In 2006, the government had also given additional directives to a government 
investigation, which had been initiated in 2004 with the objective to review the 
assistance reform. The additional directive ordered the investigator to “analyze the 
causes of the cost development and present action which can dampen and stabilize 
the development” (Dir. 2006:68). 
 As evident by the 2007 letter of appropriation and the 2006 government directive, 
the government portrayed two major problems with the assistance reform.  The first 
was depicted as issues related to insufficient formal legality. It was conceived as 
problematic that there are regional differences in the application of the personal 
assistance act. The second problem, manifested through the additional directive, as 
well as through several political statements of the time, was the rising costs of the 
reform, (See Lundström 2011:115-116; Johnson 2010:222) Given the formulation of 
the 2007 letter of appropriation, however, it seems as the government suspected that 
these two problem areas were correlated and therefore wanted the SSIA to analyze 
what effect regional differences in application had for cost development.  
 The government investigation’s answer to this query was clear. According to the 
investigation, there were two main alternatives to dampen the cost development. 
Either, by, for example, instilling lower age limits or maximum hour caps, the 
government could politically change the scope of the reform. Or, the cost could be 
dampened through measures "making the individual need assessment clearer, more 
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coherent, and in some cases more restrictive” (SOU 2008:77, p.414).
 Making the application of the legislation more coherent by clarifying and 
specifying its extent, thereby limiting caseworker discretion, was thus understood as a 
means of cost reduction. Accordingly, the analysis of the government investigation 
directly linked the strengthening of the formal aspects of the rule of law with 
dampening of costs. In the 2007 yearbook, the SSIA drew similar conclusions, 
holding strengthened formal legality to be closely connected to reduced costs:  
 
If all regions followed the assessment of the median region for women and men of 
different ages, the costs for personal assistance would be approximately 6000 million 
SEK lower in 2007. A contributing factor to the spread between the regions has been 
the former decentralization of the SSIA. The new organization of the SSIA however, 
[…] increases the prospects for improved steering and increases the possibility of 
uniformity between regions. (SSIA 2007:72)   
 
 It is clear from this statement that formal legality in terms of uniformity, 
coherence in application, and clarified assessment criteria are assumed to lower costs. 
There thus seemed to have been a widespread conception, subscribed to by both the 
SSIA and the government investigation that, in the case of assistance allowances, 
strengthened of formal legality was correlated with cutbacks. 
5.3 Rising Costs, Uniformity and Scientific Assessment 
Instruments – 2009 – 2013  
5.3.1 Supreme Court Ruling  
In 2009, some two years after the SSIA’s clarifications on basic needs, came the next 
major change to the application of the assistance reform. This because of a Supreme 
Administrative Court ruling. By further restricting the scope of how basic needs were 
to be defined and calculated, this precedential ruling cemented and further specified 
the SSIA’s independent legal positions from 2006 and 2007. Through the court 
ruling, it was determined that only ‘needs of special integrity’ should constitute basic 
needs. (SAC 2009) For example, preparing, cooking, or cutting meals would no 
longer be considered basic needs. Only assistance with the action of moving food 
from plate to mouth would constitute a basic need. Similar logic was applied to 
dressing, where now only ‘integrity sensitive’ parts should be assessed as basic needs. 
Putting on outerwear, for example, did no longer constitute a basic need. (SSIA 
2015:13) These new interpretations resulted in many people no longer reaching the 
threshold of at least 20 hours of basic needs per week and therefore lost personal 
assistance through LSS. (ISF 2016:16)   
 This court ruling, as well as the SSIA's previous legal positions, are examples of 
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vertical juridification. The LSS-legislation only mentions assistance with ‘meals' and 
‘dressing', ‘personal hygiene’, etcetera as basic needs. The SSIA and the Supreme 
Administrative Court, however, specified the political intentions of the reform to 
cover only certain aspects of these activities. The application of the act was thereby 
changed, not as a result of political decision making, but because of bureaucratic 
interpretation. Vertical juridification had thus taken place.  
5.3.2 The SSIA Acts against Inconsistencies   
The 2010 SSIA yearbook described how the agency had taken continuous measures 
to analyze the rising cost of the assistance reform. An investigation was launched to 
find out how to explain the cost increase. Additionally, to further strengthen what 
was referred to as “quality and rule of law”, the SSIA prepared “a scientific 
assessment instrument”. This instrument would assist the caseworkers in making 
uniform assessments of personal assistance allowances. The origin to the 
development of the ‘scientific assessment instrument’ was however not the SSIA’s 
but the government’s. The measure followed from a special government directive 
from 2008, requiring the SSIA to develop and implement the instrument by 2011. 
(GLA NBHW 2008) However, in their response, with regards to strengthen 
uniformity, equality in result, and other aspects of formal legality, the SSIA noted 
that such goals to some extent contradicted the intentions of the assistance reform:  
 
the assistance reform intend to provide people with severe disabilities the opportunity 
of autonomy and to influence her own life. These goals affect the possibility of creating 
general rules on how to conduct individual assessments. (SSIA 2010:74) 
 
 The quote exemplifies the dilemmic relationship between formal and material 
legality. The SSIA acknowledged that the strengthening of uniformity and the 
restriction of caseworker discretion, be it through legal positions, guidelines, or 
‘scientific assessment instruments’, to some extent conflicted with the material social-
political goals of the assistance reform.  
 However, in the SSIA yearbook from the following year, the material aspects of 
the reform were no longer mentioned. The formal aspects were, however, expanded 
on to great length. For example, under the headline “Ongoing Actions to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law and Uniformity in Assessment”, five measures were described:  
 
(1) “creating new national guidelines”,  
(2) “strengthen uniformity in the assessment of the basic needs”, analyzing 
and counteracting “regional differences in allowances”,  
(3) “introducing the requirement of a permit to provide personal 
assistance”,  
(1) “standardizing the medical assessment”, and  
(2) “implementing the before mentioned ‘scientific assessment instrument”.  
(SSIA 2011:88-89)  
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 In an interview from 2011 with a senior executive at the SSIA, it was stated that all 
the above-mentioned efforts were specifically intended to steer applications towards 
uniformity and coherence. (Assistanskoll.se 2011) Accordingly, in their efforts to 
strengthen the rule of law, which was the stated objective of the measures 
undertaken, only measures related to formal legality were listed. It thus seems as the 
SSIA’s understanding of the rule of law primarily referred to as formal legality, in the 
SSIA yearbook expressed in terms the need for coherency, uniformity, 
standardization, and centralized control and governance. 
 According to the SSIA, the heightened attention to uniformity and the rule of law, 
exemplified through the five action areas, was partly a response to the government’s 
2011 letter of appropriation, tasking the SSIA to "ensure uniform application and 
that the result application does not depend on the region" (GLA 2011:4; 
Assistanskoll.se 2011).  
5.3.3 The Government and Strengthened Uniformity 
In the 2012 letter of appropriation, the government continued to direct focus 
towards strengthening formal legality. This by tasking the SSIA to “enhance 
uniformity in relation to assessment and payment of personal assistance allowances” 
(GLA 2012:2). In the 2012 yearbook, the SSIA stated that, due to the government’s 
task, the personal assistance allowances had been a special focus for the agency. To 
accomplish the task, the SSIA, among other measures, drafted new regulations, 
prepared a new legal position, and a legal overview. New guidelines were developed 
to further assist and standardize the caseworkers’ assessments. (SSIA 2012) 
 Despite these efforts, the agency concluded that regional discrepancies still were a 
problem and that further measures were necessary to fully comply with the task of 
the government letter of appropriation. (SSIA 2012:8) A measure that could be 
further improved, according to the SSIA, was a more widespread and consistent 
application of the before mentioned ‘scientific assessment instrument’. As a 
standardized tool limits the individual caseworker's discretion, the instrument would 
further the possibilities for more coherent assessments, the agency concluded. It 
moreover enabled clear and standardized documentation of the basis of the 
assessment, which, according to the SSIA was important to assure transparency in 
the application process. (SSIA 2012:99)   
 Nonetheless, the assessment instrument received heavy critique from users and 
interest groups, as it was said to be offensive and violate the personal integrity of the 
user. This as the instrument comprised a 91-pages document where every detail of 
the user’s life is to be accounted for in great detail. Assessment of food intake alone 
covered 16 pages. The critics furthermore held that the instrument threatened the 
stated intentions of the LSS reform with regards to creating the possibility to live like 
others, independence, autonomy etcetera. This as it measured the users’ activities 
down to seconds, thereby limiting the possibility for spontaneity and change of wants 
and needs. (Assistanskoll.se 2010b; Assistanskoll.se 2010c)   
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 The debate on the “scientific assessment instrument” again highlights the 
dilemmic relation between formal and material legality. The SSIA’s strive for 
coherence, uniformity, and transparency, according to the critiques, compromised 
the material goals of the act. This measure thus shows the focus of the SSIA was to 
strengthen formal legality, perhaps in this case, at the expense of material aspects.  
5.4 Fraud, Overuse and the Rule of Law – 2014 – 2015  
As demonstrated in several letters of appropriation, the SSIA’s ongoing strive to 
strengthen formal legality seemed to be shared by the government. So also in 2014’s 
letter of appropriation where the government expanded the tasks in an additional 
‘government decision-document’. The expanded tasks covered three improvement 
areas, all encompassed under the overarching objective to “advance measures to 
achieve greater control and strengthen the rule of law in the assessments of personal 
assistance allowances” (MHSA 2014). The three areas included:  
 
(1) measures to combat fraud and overuse,  
(2) measures to limit regional differences in personal assistance application, 
and 
(3) analyze how to improve the uniformity and coherence of medical 
assessments, used in the application process.  
      
 As all three areas imply more standardized procedures, more rigorous control 
instances, more centralized governance, and less caseworker discretion, the three 
areas clearly related to measures targeting the strengthening of formal legality. 
(MHSA 2014) Accordingly, given the substance of the measures proposed to 
strengthen the rule of law, the government here expressed an understanding of the 
concept adhering its formal aspects.  
 In response to the extended government tasks, the SSIA published a specific 
report, more extensively addressing the areas of improvement. In the report, the 
agency continued to develop on measures taken to expand control, accuracy, and 
standardization in the application process. This to reduce “incorrect payments” and 
to enhance national conformity. In response to the third improvement area, the SSIA 
conducted an in-depth analysis of how to standardize and expand the use medical 
assessments in the application process. By developing more precise and 
comprehensive medical assessment tools, filled out by medical teams of doctors, 
physiotherapists, psychologists, speech therapists, etcetera, the SSIA held that the 
application process would be more uniform, transparent and objective, and thus 
contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law. (SSIA Report 2014:13-22) With 
standardized medical assessment tools, the SSIA caseworker would gain access to 
precise and clinical assessments of the users’ abilities and disabilities, the SSIA 
argued.  (SSIA Report 2015:13)     
 These measures, corresponding to the government’s task to enhance and advance 
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medical assessments in the personal assistance application, further strengthened the 
formal aspects of the rule of law, and further limited the material aspects. This by 
reducing caseworker discretion and by strengthening the value ascribed to the 
medical assessments tool in the application process, as opposed adhering to the 
needs as described by the assistance user. As need assessments conducted by the 
SSIA became further standardized and medicalized, the underlying intentions of the 
legislation, to strengthen self-determination and autonomy of the user were thus 
increasingly devalued in order to strengthen the rule of law, understood in terms of 
formal legality. 
  The 2015 letter of appropriation tasked the SSIA to continue to focus on the three 
areas of improvement stipulated in the 2014 additional letter of appropriation. (GLA 
2015:8) It furthermore highlighted the ongoing debate on fraud and overuse being 
especially prevalent in personal assistance. The first sentence of the section 
describing the goals for the assistance stated that “[t]he SSIA shall ensure sufficient 
control over personal assistance allowances to counteract overuse” (GLA 2015:2). 
This objective constituted the baseline for the focus of the assistance reform. 
Consequently, to effectively combat overuse, the government tasked the SSIA to 
enhance control over allowance payments by making the application process more 
“uniform and systematic” (GLA 2015:6). The government stated that taking 
measures strengthening coherence and uniformity, and limiting regional differences 
in allowances would “strengthen the rule of law in the application process, so that 
the correct decision and the correct payment are issued” (GLA 2015:2). 
 As such, in the 2015 letter of appropriation, the government again tasked the SSIA 
to take further measures making the application process more uniform, more 
systematized, and less dependent on the discretion of the individual caseworker. This 
would, according the government, strengthen the rule of law and thereby also 
increase control and limit overuse. 
 In the 2015 yearbook, the SSIA declared to have taken measures corresponding 
with the government task to “strengthen the rule of law in the application process”. 
The SSIA interpreted this task as ensuring “justice in outcome”, which, according to 
the agency had been the main focus during the year. According to the agency, 
“justice in outcome” implied coherence, uniformity, predictability, and that the 
outcome of an application is completely independent of the individual caseworker. 
(SSIA 2014:27, 2015:124; SIR 2012:11) “Justice in outcome”, as understood by the 
SSIA, thus directly correspond with what herein is referred to as formal legality.  
Accordingly, given the focus on “justice in outcome”, the SSIA seemingly subscribed 
to the government’s conception on the importance on focusing on the formal 
aspects of the rule of law.  
5.4.1 Limiting Discretion  
A consequence of taking measures strengthening formal legality and thus a coherent 
and systematic application processes, is limited room for discretion. Discretion leads 
to discrepancies in application and is thereby not compatible with coherency and 
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“justice in outcome”. In 2015, the SSIA expressed this conclusion by declaring that 
an area of special importance was increased uniformity and that “discretion in 
combination with insufficient guidance have negative effects on uniformity” (SSIA 
2015:28-29). This was also the conclusion of a government issued investigation, 
conducted by the supervisory government agency ‘The Social Insurance Inspectorate’ 
(SII). In 2014, the government tasked the SII to “identify shortcomings in current 
legislation and application regarding assistance benefits” (SII 2015:9, p. 12). In 
summary, the SII concluded that the personal assistance legislation was: 
 
ambiguous, one problem being that key concepts, such as participation, independence and 
living as others which are often emphasized as embodying the aim of the legislation in 
Assistance Benefit have not been defined in the law or legislative history. As a result, 
when evaluating entitlement to personal assistance, it is difficult for the SSIA to make a 
coherent, transparent assessment adhering to the rule of law. […] Owing to this, the number of 
hours applied for is to a high extent granted. As a consequence, the granted hours per 
week for personal assistance (on average) have increased each year since the law was 
introduced. (SII 2015:9, p.13, my italics) 
 
 The investigation thus drew two main conclusions regarding the problems with 
the assistance legislation. First, the undefined key concepts of the legislation hindered 
formal legality as it limited coherence and lead to inadequate transparency. This as 
the ambiguous concepts created space for interpretation and discretion for the 
individual caseworker. According to the report, these problems spurred the second 
issue: the rising costs of the reform. The rising cost were, the report argued, a direct 
consequence of the unspecified nature of the key concepts, rendering application 
result incoherent. Evidently, strengthened formal legality was understood as 
corresponding with dampened costs, whilst material legality in terms of caseworker 
discretion and adherence to underlying political goals were perceived leading to rising 
costs. Same conclusions were draw in a report drafted by the SSIA in 2015. The 
report held that “[t]here seem to be a relation between undefined regulations and the 
cost development within the assistance between” (SIR 2015:13, p.23). In addition, 
the SSIA agreed with the SII regarding the risks associated with the rule of law 
brought about by the undefined and ambiguous key concepts. (SIR 2015:13, p.21-22)
 To address the problems identified in the reports and to respond to the 
government letter of appropriation, the SSIA launched a rigorous action-package. To 
make the assessment of the so-called ‘parent responsibility’ more coherent and 
standardized, the agency developed a court case review, a new legal position and an 
updated guide for the caseworkers. (SSIA 2015:63) The SSIA furthermore issued a 
new guide, standardizing and clarifying the assessment process and time calculations, 
developed a new coherent model for benefit assessment, and introduced a new ‘need 
assessment instrument’. All these measures had the explicit goal to strengthen the 
rule of law by enhancing coherency, transparency and decrease differences in 
application between caseworkers. (SSIA 2015:148)   
 Evidently, the measures taken to strengthen the rule of law all corresponded with 
formal aspects of legality, why it seems as when the rule of law, almost exclusively, 
were understood as formal legality. Consequently, as the measures taken further 
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specified the interpretation and application of the legislation, thereby specifying 
aspects previously interpretable, the reform was further juridified.    
 Another major development juridifying the personal assistance act came in June 
2015 when the Supreme Administrative Court issued a court ruling regarding the 
basic need ‘active supervision’. Until then, ‘active supervision’ had constituted a basic 
need for all types of disabilities. However, the court ruling meant that only people 
with ‘mental disabilities’ were to be granted assistance for ‘active supervision’. (SSIA 
2015:13) The new interpretation resulted in many users losing their assistance 
between 2014 and 2015. Consequently, the approval rate for personal assistance 
applications decreased drastically. Especially children were declined assistance due to 
the ruling. This as children with, for example, difficulties breathing, requiring 
supervision large portions of the day, did not meet the requisite of twenty hours of 
basic needs per week and thereby lost their assistance allowance. (SIR 2016:5, p.58)  
5.5 “Break the Development” – 2016-2017 
Despite plummeting approval rates, which continued in 2016, the costs of the 
assistance reform continued to increase. Since 2005, the average number of hours of 
assistance granted per week had risen from 99 to 127, as of January 2016. During the 
same period, the total costs of the reform had gone up from 14 335 million SEK per 
year, to 29 774 million SEK at the end of 2015.  (Assistanskoll.se Statistics)  
 For a long time, the government had expressed worry regarding the cost 
development and had over the years instigated several investigations and tasked the 
SSIA to account for the increasing costs. Despite efforts to account for the rising 
costs, a gap remained which could not be explained by any of the investigations or 
the SSIA. Several investigations, as well as government statements, ascribed the 
development to extensive fraud, private assistance providers overusing the system to 
maximize profits, and to ambiguous legislation leaving ample room for discretion in 
the application. As such, the fact that the cost development could not be fully 
explained left the SSIA and the government to assume that the rising cost stemmed 
from “incorrect payments” (Altermark 2017:108, 115-17; Begler & Lender 2016). 
 At the end of 2015, the political debate on personal assistance was primarily 
focused on rising costs, fraud, overuse, and private companies seeking to exploit the 
vaguely defined personal assistance legislation. Furthermore, in October 2015, during 
the midst of the refugee crisis, in an interview, the Minister of Treasures, Magdalena 
Andersson, declared that “the cost development in areas of rising costs, such as sick 
leave allowances and personal assistance allowances, must be dampened” 
(Assistanskoll.se 2015).     
 It is within this context the government in the 2016 Letter of Appropriation tasks 
the SSIA to “break the development of hours granted within the personal assistance 
act” (GLA 2016:1). The task thus compelled the SSIA to find ways to restrict 
assistance allowances. However, the government issued no instructions on how cost 
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reductions were to be made.  The responsible minister, Åsa Regnér, refused to make 
any suggestions on how to “break the development”, holding such instructions 
would imply ministerial and thus be unconstitutional. (Assistanskoll.se 2016a)
 Despite not containing any specific instruction on how to dampen costs, the 2016 
letter of apparition came with additional tasks guiding the focus of the SSIA. In 
addition to what at this point must be considered yearly mantras to enhance 
coherence in application, ensure lawful and qualitative application, and extended 
measures to combat overuse, the government in 2016 granted the SSIA extra 
resources for a strengthened legal representative. (GLA 2016) The extra resources 
were to be used to: 
 
based on the need for precedent rulings, provide more guiding court rulings in areas of 
large caseworker discretion and where the decisions have significant economic 
consequences for individuals and the public. The correct person shall receive the 
correct compensation. Overuse shall be counteracted. (GLA 2016) 
 
 Accordingly, through the strengthened legal representative, the government tasked 
the SSIA to, more extensively than before, force court rulings to clarify and specify 
concepts and areas of the legislation open to caseworker discretion and 
interpretation. This to ensure that the ‘correct’ and lawful decision was taken every 
time, independent of the caseworker. Consequently, the government explicitly tasked 
the SSIA to further juridify the assistance reform through court rulings.   
 In 2016, responding to the government’s letter of appropriation, the SSIA took 
extensive measures to dampen the cost development and further juridify the reform 
by “clarify the legal application”. Except for measures targeting administrative and 
procedural reforms, these included:  
 
(1) revised guides clarifying and specifying how to interpret and act on the 
legislation, 
(2)  a new guide clarifying the SSIA’s interpretation of the Supreme 
Administrative Court ruling on active supervision, and 
(3) an independent legal position specifying the interpretation of “good 
living-conditions”, constitutes one of the underlying social-political goals 
stated in the legislation.  
(SSIA Legal Position 2016:09; SSIA 2016:131)  
 
 Notably, these measures were supposed to “break the development of hours 
granted” as well as “clarify the legal application”. The SSIA therefore seemed to 
understand the two objectives as correlated. Correspondingly, vertical juridification, 
according to the SSIA, implied dampened cost development. Moreover, in the 
summer of 2016, the SSIA began to interpret and apply a Supreme Administrative 
Court ruling from 2012 regarding ‘self-care’. According to the new legal 
interpretation, the SSIA concluded that ‘self-care’ should never constitute a basic 
need. (ISF 2016:16)      
 To shortly summarize the ruling, it examined a case where an autistic girl with a 
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connective tissue disease causing pain. To relive the pain, she was given hot baths 
and massage. The court ruled that this treatment was to be perceived as health-care 
under the ‘health-care act’, rather than ‘self-care’ and could principally thereof not be 
considered in the assessment of personal assistance. However, the court stressed that 
health-care could be considered ‘self-care’ and thereby constitute basis for needs 
other than ‘basic needs’ and thereby grant personal assistance. This was also the 
interpretation of the SSIA being implemented in the summer of 2016. ‘Self-care’ 
would no longer constitute a ‘basic need’, which it had previously. (SAC 2012; ISF 
2016:16)     
 In the updated legal guidelines where the new interpretations were stated, the 
SSIA listed activities that were to be considered ‘self-care’ or ‘health care’ and thereby 
never could constitute a ‘basic need’. The activities included, for example, assistance 
with gavage, assistance with breathing support appliances, suction of mucus from the 
oral cavity or a tracheal cannula, and change of ostomy pouch. In the SSIA’s 2016 
application of the 2012 court ruling, needs such as breathing and feeding did not 
constitute basic needs as they now became specified as ‘self-care’. (ISF 2016:16, p.43)
 After the announcement that the SSIA would start to interpret the ruling from 
2012, critiques argued that, considering the timing of the new legal application, it 
came in response to the government’s task to dampen the cost of the assistance 
reform. The SSIA strongly refuted these claims and stressed that the new legal 
application was part of a process to clarify areas and concepts of the legislation. This 
to achieve greater coherences and uniformity in application. (Assistanskoll.se 2016c) 
The new and specified interpretation meant that many users lost personal assistance 
and that more applications were rejected, as they no longer passed the threshold of a 
minimum of 20 hours of basic need per week. (ISF 2016:16, p.39)
 Whether the specification the legislations were done in response to dampen costs 
or to strengthen coherences, the SSIA’s measures shows that discretion is 
understood as correlated with cost increase. This notion was again forwarded in a 
SSIA report from 2016 where it was stated that “several government investigations 
and other reports have pointed out that un-clarities in the legislation probably 
contribute to the cost increases” (SSIA 2016:11, p. 6). The SSIA thus undoubtedly 
perceived legislative ambiguities as related to cost increases, in addition to it 
weakening coherency in application. 
 During 2016, the government received massive critique for the formulation in the 
letter of appropriation to ‘break the development of hours granted’. The responsible 
minister claimed that the government’s intentions never were to cut down assistance 
allowances for those “actually needing it”. Instead, she held, the task was intended to 
make sure that less “incorrect decisions” were made and that fraud and overuse were 
repressed. (Regnér 2016; Regnér 2018) However, given the critique, in the 2017 letter 
of appropriation, the task to ‘break the development’ was erased. Despite this, the 
government still held that assistance allowances had to be limited.  
 Indicatively, in 2016, the government issued a government investigation with the 
mission to address two of the main issued associated with the assistance reform. One 
of focus areas contained directives for the investigation to finds ways to cut down on 
costs on the assistance reform. The second main area of focus was to clarify and 
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specify the legislation. Especially founding concepts such as “good living-conditions” 
and “the right to live like others”, needed to be further defined, according to the 
government’s directives (Dir 2016:40, p.16, 18). However, in the directives, the two 
objectives were not perceived as independent of each other. Rather, and as indicated 
previously, specification and clarification were conceived as means to limit the 
number of users and thereby reduce costs. Accordingly, the government directed the 
investigation to: 
 
[S]uggest how to restrict personal assistance with regards to number of users and/or 
number of hours. It may mean to more precisely and clearer define when and for what 
assistance should be granted, for example by further specify concepts such as “other 
personal needs”. (Dir 2016:40, p.22) 
 
 The directive further indicates that the government understood formal legality, 
described in terms of coherences, specification, and predictability, as closely related 
to cost reduction.  
5.6 Summary of the Development  
 
To summarize the last thirteen years of the assistance reform, the legal application of 
the legislation has become increasingly specified and standardized. This directly 
resulting from several major court rulings, stricter SSIA guidelines, standardizing the 
application procedure, and more specified legal interpretations, further limiting 
caseworker discretion. The overall result is a reform where now only 17 percent of all 
applications are granted assistance, compared to circa 75 percent ten years ago. In 
2005, only 53 people lost assistance due to falling under the 20 hours threshold. In 
2015 that number was 146 people and in 2017, 473 people lost their assistance after 
not meeting the sharpened requirements. (Assistanskoll.se 2017) The government 
have repeatedly claimed they have no part in the cutbacks of the assistance reform. 
According to them, the cutbacks are solely caused by court rulings and SSIA 
interpretations, over which the government has no control. (Regnér 2018) 
  However, as of November 2017 the government pulled the emergency breaks, 
declaring that no further reassessments regarding personal assistance were to be 
conducted until the submission of the government investigation. This decision came 
after a Supreme Court ruling in the summer of 2017, which, according to the SSIA, 
would undermine the whole reform and force even more people out of the reform. 
This is where the reform is now. In a state of complete standstill, awaiting the results 
of the government investigation.  
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6 Juridification, Rule of Law, and 
Governance  
 
This second part of the analysis consolidates the development sketched in the first 
section. As such, the first section analyzes the development of the assistance reform 
in terms of juridification. The second section brings together and analyses what the 
material reveals in terms of formal contra material legality and how the rule of law 
concept have developed. Thirdly, I suggest an alternative way of understanding of 
how juridification and the perception of the rule of law relates to governance and 
power. By doing so, I indicate how the cutbacks of the assistance reform have been 
governed.  
6.1 Juridicalization of Personal Assistance  
My interpretation of the material shows that, in tandem with the conceptual 
progression towards formal legality, the assistance reform has become increasingly 
juridified. The overarching focus on coherency, standardized applications, and 
transparency have spawned measures vertically juridifying the legislation. 
Consequently, large amounts of standardized guidelines have been drafted, clarifying 
legal positions have been produced, and previously open concepts have been defined 
and specified.      
 An illustrative example of this juridification process is the SSIA internal guidelines 
aimed to assist the caseworkers in the application process. The first version of the 
guideline covered 157 pages. The 2010 version comprised 189 pages, whereas the 
2017 edition encompasses 209 pages of clarified guidelines and specifications. (SSIA 
Guideline 2005; 2010; 2017) Caseworker discretion has thus been decreased during 
this time, allowing less room for case-contextual interpretations in accordance with 
the social-political goals of the legislation. Instead, through vertical juridification, 
coherence and uniformity has been strengthened.   
 Except for juridification processes lead by measures taken by the SSIA, several 
court rulings have further pushed the development. In this analysis, I have only 
described a few or the many court rulings further specifying the applications of the 
personal assistance legislation. The ones I have mentioned are however usually 
depicted as the most crucial, having severe impact for how the legislation is 
interpreted and applied. (Näsman 2016; SIR 2017:4) However, court rulings are 
usually not applied directly. Rather, the actual application of court rulings ultimately 
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depends upon the interpretation of the SSIA. As with the case of the 2012 
Administrative Court ruling regarding “self-care”, the court took precedent stance in 
declaring “self-care” was not to be considered basic need. It did not, however, 
specify what was to be considered “self-care”. This was first specified in the SSIA’s 
legal interpretation of the ruling, issued in 2016. According to several legal experts, 
including the independent government agency the Social Insurance Inspectorate, the 
legal interpretation of the SSIA was more categorical and extensive than the court 
ruling suggested. (ISF 2016:16, p.38, 39; Assistanskoll.se 2016b) Moreover, the SSIA 
did not interpret or apply the result until four years after the ruling.  As such, 
juridification following court rulings are not necessarily the direct result of court 
rulings but happens in relation with the SSIA and their legal interpretation.  
 In summary, it is evident that the personal assistance act has undergone a process 
of vertical juridification. During the period studied, vertical juridification, in terms of 
more specified legal applications, more extensive caseworkers’ guidelines, and 
precedential court rulings, have progressed. These findings correspond with what 
Brännström and others (see Lindblom 2004:237; Fransson 2016) have described as a 
structural trend of juridification of Swedish welfare legislation and application, 
leading general, goal oriented frame-legislation to become increasingly specified 
through legal norms implemented by courts and government agencies. (2009:157)     
6.2 Formal contra Material Legality 
The analysis has shown that development depicted by Bendz (2010) and others 
(Fransson 2016; Johansson 2011) has continued. My interpretation suggests that a 
formal understanding of the rule of law has become increasingly prevalent. As such, I 
hold that the meaning and knowledge attached to the concept has shifted towards 
formal legality. This is manifested not least by the ways the reform is descried, which 
problems are defined, which solutions are portrayed as viable to those problems, and 
which measures have been taken.  
6.2.1 The SSIA and the Meaning of Rule of Law 
In 2010, the SSIA described the inherent contradiction in the relation between 
material contra formal legality. This as the SSIA inferred that an increasing 
specification of assessment criteria could reduce the discretion of the individual 
caseworker and thus damage adherence to the underlying social-political goals of the 
legislation. (SSIA 2010:74) However, as times went by, the discussions regarding 
formal contra material legality became less frequent. Between 2010 and 2017, the vast 
majority of the material studied refer solely to a conception of the rule of law 
corresponding with formal legality. The material aspects of the concept were 
generally described as problematic. Discretion, legal and conceptual interpretation, 
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and incoherencies were depicted as having excursively negative impact on the rule of 
law. The material thus infers that the SSIA, with regards to the personal assistance 
act, valued measures enforcing formal legality. Similar conclusions are drawn by 
Erlandsson (2014:46-47), holding that SSIA caseworkers primarily follow 
standardized guidelines and seek to categories all cases and situation so they fit in 
their internal manuals and legal guides. Consequently, he argues, adherence to the 
specific context and the individual need of the applicant, and thereby the underlying 
goals of the personal assistance legislation, is often bypassed for a more literal 
interpretation of the legislation. Erlandsson concludes that caseworkers make 
decisions regarding welfare benefits which is characterized by “standardization and 
large degrees of detailed control” (Erlandsson 2014:51).   
 My interpretation is that the SSIA, both in their application and development 
process, increasingly have come to perceive the rule of law as primarily implying 
formal legality. As such, in relation to interpretative policy analysis, I hold that the 
practices of the SSIA, formed by the meaning and understanding of the organization, 
are reflective of this perception of the rule of law, stressing practices aimed to 
strengthen coherency, uniformity and transparency.   
6.2.2 The Government and the Meaning of Rule of Law 
 
With regards to the government, it seems their conception of the rule of law in many 
have been similar to the SSIA’s. My contestation is thus that also the government 
have progressed to more predominately understand formal legality as the main 
concern and primary substance of the rule of law.   
 The government’s letters of appropriation between of 2005 and 2006, as well as 
those between 2008 and 2010, did not task the SSIA to take any special measures 
towards strengthening formal legality. Rather, they tasked the SSIA to strengthen the 
rights for disabled, thereby appealing to the underlying social-political goals of the 
legislation. However, in a legislative proposal from 2009, the government asked the 
parliament to give the SSIA the responsibility to oversee and implement measures to 
strengthen uniformity in personal assistance allowances. This legislative proposal had 
been developed in response to several government investigations and reports, 
declaring that the regional differences in personal assistance allowances, allegedly 
resulting in both rising costs and legitimacy issues, were likely due to the vagueness 
of founding concepts and others unclarified regarding the application of the 
legislation.  (SOU 2008:77, p.43; ESV 2011:11, p.126; SSIA Report 2011) 
 Although the government during this period, to a limited extend, tasked the SSIA 
to take measures towards formal legality, the general perception of the government 
was clearly that the personal assistance act was problematically vague, resulting in 
rising costs and incoherencies in the application process. Accordingly, in 2011, the 
government tasked the SSIA to "ensure uniform application and that the result 
application does not depend on the region". (GLA 2011) In contrast to the letters of 
appropriation from 2005 and 2006, none of letters after 2010 tasked the SSIA to pay 
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special attention to the social-political goals of the reform. On the contrary, every 
letter of appropriation onwards explicitly tasked the SSIA to take measures 
necessitating strengthened formal legality, often expressed in term of enhanced 
uniformity and coherence in applications, and minimizing regional discrepancies. 
These issues would, according to the government, be resolved by further clarifying 
the legislation and more specifically guide caseworker through the application 
process.      
 A demonstrative example of this logic is found in the 2016 letter of appropriation, 
granting the SSIA extra resources for a strengthened legal representative to “provide 
more guiding court rulings in areas of large caseworker discretion”, so that the “[t]he 
correct person receive the correct compensation” (GLA 2016:7). My interpretation is 
that this statement is based on meaning and understanding associating the rule of law 
primarily with formal legality. This as the rationale embedded is the statement would 
not be compatible with a material perception of the rule of law. In a conceptual 
realm where material legality is perceived a vital aspect of the rule of law, the 
‘correctness’ of a decision depends on the individual need of the applicant and the 
caseworker's interpretation of those needs in relation to the intentions of the 
legislation. The correct decision would imply a result relative to the specific context 
of the case, the caseworker’s interoperation of the intentions of the legislation in 
relation to the needs of the user, etcetera. Consequently, it is my contestation that the 
government articulated a formal understanding of legality, where ‘correctness’ 
ultimately referred to uniform application of the legislation, minimizing caseworker 
discretion to eradicate differences in interpretation and application. According to my 
interpretation, this was the understanding constituting the practices of the 
government throughout the material analyzed.      
 As described, the focus of the SSIA and the government has, since around the late 
1980’s, increasingly, shifted towards formal legality, partly evidenced by the complete 
centralization of the whole agency. My analysis shows that that formal legality is 
continuously understood as highly desirable, whereas values associated with material 
legality are perceived as problematic and illegitimate. The knowledge and meaning 
ascribed to the values of the rule of law thus seem to have shifted. From previously 
balancing both formal and material legality, to more and more perceiving only formal 
legality as desirable.  
6.3 Governing with the Rule of Law, through 
juridicalization 
As the analysis has shown, the assistance reform has become increasingly juridified 
and that this development has been interlinked with the government and the SSIA 
progressively perceiving and applying the rule of law in terms of formal legality, 
rather than material legality. The question then is: how does this development and 
changes in understanding and meaning relate to the governance and cutbacks of the 
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assistance reform? According to the literature, as well as the government, the 
juridification of the assistance reform should imply a transfer of power away from 
the government, to the SSIA and the administrative courts. Based on the analysis, I 
will in the following scrutinize this conception. 
6.3.1 Constituting the Rule of Law 
As showcased by Bendz (2010) and others (Brännström 2009; Fransson 2016), the 
development towards a formal understanding of the rule of law, often resulting in 
juridification, has been an ongoing process since the late 1980’s. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that the development has continued and that the SSIA and political actors 
progressively have come to understand formal legality as desirable and material 
legality as problematic. From the centralization of 2005 and for a few years onwards, 
my interpretation is that the SSIA considered it an overarching goal to strengthen 
formal legality in relation to material legality. This independent of government letters 
and tasks. However, the tradeoff between formal and material legality is a balance-
act, more of the former usually implies less of the latter and vice versa.   
 My interpretation of the material is that the SSIA was aware of the tradeoff and 
sought to keep a balance between the two components. This is demonstrated by the 
2010 yearbook. Therein the SSIA concludes that the social-political goals of the 
assistance reform, such as autonomy and influence over one’s life, limit the 
possibilities to construct specified rules and guides for how to conduct individual 
assessment. This conclusion came as a response to the government’s task to 
construct a ‘scientific instrument’ to reduce differences in application and make the 
assessment process more coherent. (SSIA 2010:73-74) My interpretation is that the 
SSIA perceived the rule of law as a balance between formal and material legality, and 
that both components had merit in the application of the legislation.  
 However, in none of the yearbooks to come does the SSIA ever acknowledge this 
balance and tradeoff again. On the contrary, in the 2011 yearbook, the SSIA 
accounted for several measures taken to strengthen coherency and reduce differences 
in application, thereby increasingly shifting balance towards formal legality. These 
measures were, according to the SSIA, a consequence of the governments task to 
"ensure uniform application and that the result application does not depend on the 
region" (GLA 2011; Assistanskoll.se 2011).   
 My interpretation of these events is that the SSIA, influenced by the government’s 
explicit focus on coherency and uniformity, shifted their conception of the desirable 
balance between formal and material legality. In every letter of appropriation to 
come, the government tasked the SSIA to take measures aimed to strengthen formal 
legality. The SSIA, in turn, responded by doing just that, without again discussing the 
tradeoff between formal and material legality.    
 As such, I suggest that the meaning and understanding the SSIA ascribed the rule 
of law-concept, over the years, have been further pushed towards perceiving formal 
legality valuable. This by government tasks and propositions, continuously holding 
that formal legality is to be enhanced and that material legality is harmful and 
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problematic. My contestation is therefore that the meaning and understanding 
attributed to the rule of law through government’s tasks and statements, have 
constituted the practices of the SSIA. As a result, the agency has come to increasingly 
share the government’s concepts of the rule of law as ultimately referring to formal 
legality.      
 This is further illustrated in the 2015 yearbook where the SSIA responded to the 
government’s task to “strengthen the rule of law in the application process” by taking 
extensive measures to ensure “justice in outcome”. As previously stated, the meaning 
and understanding ascribed to “justice in outcome” seem to have been directly 
corresponding with the values of formal legality, seeking to achieve coherency, 
uniformity, predictability, and assessment results independent of the individual 
caseworker. (SSIA 2014:27; SSIA 2015:124; SIR 2012:11) My interpretation is that 
the SSIA perceived the task to “strengthen the rule of law” as equated with 
enhancing formal legality. Therefore, to comply with the government’s intentions, 
the SSIA took measures they thought corresponded with the government’s 
understanding of the rule of law concept, namely formal legality. 
 This example is demonstrative of how the government, over the years, has 
conveyed a meaning and understanding of the rule of law-concept, leading the SSIA 
to strive for an application process corresponding primarily with values of formal 
legality, thereby disregarding material legality. As such, the government have been 
constitutive of the SSIA’s understanding and meaning of the rule of law, and have 
thereby also been constitutive of the practices of the agency. This has shaped and 
molded the SSIA to take measures adhering to formal legality, thereby further driving 
vertical juridification.     
 As held by Wagenaar (2011:4), meaning and understanding is constitutive of 
practice. Accordingly, I suggest that the government’s understanding and meaning 
ascribed to the rule of law-concept have constituted also the SSIA understanding of 
the concept. Consequently, it has also constituted SSIA practice in terms of measures 
taken, thereby further driving the process of vertical juridification. So, how does this 
conclusion relate to governance and the cutbacks of the assistance reform?  
6.3.2 Governing with the Rule of Law  
As the analysis of the material demonstrates, the cost development of the assistance 
reform has frequently been described as connect with deficiencies in formal legality 
and too much emphasis on material legality. In 2007, the SSIA (2007:72) concluded 
that about 6000 million SEK could be saved if uniformity and coherency was 
strengthened. Approximately six months later, a government investigation proposed 
that the costs of the assistance reform could be damped by “making the individual 
need assessment clearer, more coherent, and in some cases more restrictive” (SOU 
2008:77, p.414). In the 2015, the Social Insurance Inspectorate concluded that the 
“ambiguous” nature of some of the key concepts of the assistance legislation made it 
difficult for the SSIA “to make a coherent, transparent assessment”. Consequently, 
the report stated, the granted hours for personal assistance “have increased each year 
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since the law was introduced” (SII 2015:9, p.13). The report thus linked the lack of 
coherency and transparency, i.e. insufficient formal legality, to cost increase. It 
thereby also subscribed to the understanding of further specification and clarification 
of the legislation, i.e. vertical juridification, as a means to lower costs. Similar 
undertandings were expressed in an SSIA report from 2016 stating that “several 
government investigations and other reports have pointed out that un-clarities in the 
legislation probably contribute to the cost increases” (SSIA 2016:11, p. 6). The 
government also explicitly adhered to this conception in a directive to a government 
investigation. The government there tasked the investigation to ”suggest how to 
restrict personal assistance with regards to number of users and/or number of hours. 
It may mean to more precisely and clearer define when and for what assistance 
should be granted, for example by further specify concepts such as “other personal 
needs.” (Dir 2016:40, p.22)   
 Evidently, there has been a widespread perception among experts and actors that 
unspecified concepts and applications, leaving room for caseworker discretion, drives 
the cost development. Accordingly, my interpretation is that the prevalent meaning 
and knowledge, within the government as well as the SSIA, have been that 
unspecified legal application, incoherencies, caseworker discretion, and other aspect 
related to material legality, are correlated with cost increases. Consequently, this 
understanding thus also infers that vertical juridification is correlated with cost 
decreases.      
 As held by Hajer and Wagenaar (2003), to understand practice and thus power, we 
must dig out and interpret the meaning and understanding constitutive of practice. 
Given the prevalent meaning and understating holding that increased vertical 
juridification is correlated with cost decrease, the government tasking SSIA to 
increase vertical juridification by strengthening coherency and uniformity, limiting 
discrepancy and caseworker discretion, implementing medical assessment tools, 
granting extra funds to clarify legal concepts, etcetera, should not be perceived as 
apolitical or disconnected from the cutbacks of the assistance reform.  
 By inferring meaning and understanding to the rule of law-concept so that it 
progressively came to signify and value formal legality, the government essentially 
steered the SSIA to take measures driving the personal assistance act towards 
increased vertical juridification. As juridification was understood as leading to 
reduced costs, guiding the development towards increased juridification, I hold, must 
be conceived of as governmental governance towards austerity.  
 Therefore, I suggest, to properly unpack the governance of the reform, we must 
understand the government’s constitution of meaning and knowledge as the 
constitution of practice and therefor as expressions of discretion and power. This 
challenge both the government and the juridification literature, holding that 
juridification renders political actors powerless. However, by constituting the 
desirable perception and application of the rule of law, lending the SSIA to take 
measures further juridifying the reform, my analysis suggests that the government in 
fact govern through juridification. As such, juridicalization does not necessarily lead 
to lessened governmental power and discretion. Rather, the juridicalization process 
itself is a display of power and discretion.   
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 Therefore, as oppose the juridicalization literature and government statements, I 
suggest that juridicalization does not necessarily infer the transfer of discretionary 
power away from government.  Even though the cutbacks of the reform, on the face 
of it are the direct consequence of court rulings, SSIA interpretations and 
specifications, I have shown how these actions have been constituted by the 
government’s meaning and understanding. By perceiving power and discretion not 
only as direct rulings and actions but also as the constitution of certain practices, I 
hold that the government have governed the austerity of the assistance reform. This 
not by taking any political decisions or change to the law’s wording or intentions but 
by constituting practices inevitably leading to juridification. The juridification of the 
assistance reform, therefore, ought not to be understood as the transfer of power 
away from government, to the SSIA and administrative courts, but as an expression 
of government power. As such, juridification, in this case, should not be perceived as 
a zero-sum game. The juridification of the reform has indeed given courts and the 
SSIA power to interpret and apply the legislation, but not at the cost of government 
discretion, still constituting the conceptual limits for how the legislation is to be 
interpreted and applied. 
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7 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
To summarize what the analysis has gathered with regards to the research questions, 
I draw two main conclusions.    
 First, the cutbacks of the assistance reform can largely be understood as a result 
of an increasing perception of the rule of law equated to formal legality, which has 
driven the development towards further vertical juridification. The development is 
concretized by the SSIA developing more clarifying legal interpretations, publishing 
specifying caseworker guidelines, crafting standardized assessment tools and 
procedures, forcing precedent court rulings to define concepts and norms previously 
susceptible for discretionary interoperation and an overall commitment to making 
the legal application of the reform coherent, standardized and transparent. The 
juridification process has furthermore been driven by court rulings not necessarily 
instigated by the SSIA, but still in its application leading to more restricted 
assessments.     
 Aggregated, these juridifying practices have led to today’s situation where fewer 
are granted personal assistance, fewer hours of assistance are accepted, and more 
people loose assistance as they no longer reach the threshold of twenty hours of 
basic needs per week. Consequently, the cutbacks of the assistance reform have 
occurred without direct political ruling or decision-making. Ultimately, the cutbacks 
on the reform has been the result of bureaucratic applications and actions. According 
to scholarly literature and government rhetoric, this suggest that the juridification of 
the reform has rendered the government and the parliament increasingly powerless. 
Consequently, the reform, they argue, has become increasingly depoliticized as 
discretionary power has been transferred from politicians to courts and bureaucrats.
 My second main conclusion however, with regards to what the juridification of 
the assistance reform entails in terms of power and governance, suggests that the 
bureaucratic applications and actions leading to cutbacks, did not take place in a 
vacuum. Rather, the cutbacks were constituted by meanings and understandings 
holding juridifying measures to be desirable and necessary, whilst also suggesting that 
the opposite, namely context-specific interpretation and discretion adhering to the 
underlying social-political goals of the legislation, were undesirable and problematic. I 
hold that the government have been part of constituting this perception, ultimately 
leading to cutbacks.      
 The conclusion that the government’s constitution of SSIA practice should be 
regarded as governance, discretion, and politics, is further strengthened by the 
prevailing understating that juridification and cutbacks are correlated. The 
constitution of SSIA’s meaning and understanding necessitating juridification must 
therefore, I hold, be regarded as political power and discretion. The government 
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thereby governed the reform, not through direct actions or decisions, but through 
the juridification process itself. Therefore, I hold that have power not been 
transferred, despite increased juridification. Power and discretion over the assistance 
reform have not been transferred, it has been transformed. Instead of utilizing power 
through direct political decisions and legislative change, the government have utilized 
power to constitute the actions of an independent government agency. Accordingly, 
in the case of the personal assistance act, juridification has not lead to depoliticization 
as it has not transferred power and direction away from political actors. It has merely 
changed how power is utilized.   
7.1 Further Research  
In this thesis I have shown that in the case of the assistance reform, juridification has 
not transferred power away from the government. Rather, the government have 
governed through constituting the practices leading to juridification of the reform. I 
have thereby, in opposition to both government rhetoric and scholarly literature, 
shown that juridification does not necessarily infer the transfer of power away from 
political actors. However, I can herein only draw conclusions based on the findings 
of the particular case of personal assistance. I cannot say anything about whether this 
dynamic and mode of governance is prevalent also in other juridified reforms and 
policy fields. Although this would not be surprising given the similarities the 
assistance reform share with other Swedish welfare legislations, additional studies 
would have to be conducted to make stronger general claims.    
 Moreover, this study does not suppose or deduct whether the governmental 
governance of the assistance reform has been a deliberative tactic or not. To deduce 
whether a certain practice is intended to reach a certain goal is in many ways a 
fruitless endeavor. As we can cannot, hold, separate between what stems from 
discursive structures and what was deliberative tactics, we cannot deductively trace 
the ‘true’ origin of an idea or action. The structure will always, to some degree, be 
constitutive of the tactics, and vice versa.  As forwarded, the understanding of rule of 
law as formal legality, spawning juridification, has been broad structural development 
since the 1980’s. As held by Habermas (1987:356-363), the juridification of polices is 
in many ways a built in mechanism of modern bureaucracy. Therefore, to claim that 
the government’s constitution of the understanding and meaning of the rule of law 
as formal legality have been solely a deliberate political tactic would be to neglect 
structural discursive tendencies which to various degrees constitute the meaning and 
understanding of all actors. However, regardless the degree of deliberation of 
governmental governance involved in the cutbacks of the assistance reform, it is to 
be regarded as displays power. As forwarded by Wagenaar (2011:4), power is 
embedded within practices and actions, irrespective of explicit motives and tactics. 
 Conversely, I have in this thesis analyzed the mechanisms and logics of 
governance and not the intentions of governance.  Accordingly, to answer questions 
regarding the degree of intentionality of the cutbacks of the assistance reform, other 
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types of studies would have to be conducted, posing different questions, and using 
different methodological perspectives. Here, I suffice to suggest that the 
government, deliberatively or not, have governed the cutbacks.   
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